University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
7-2018

Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law (112:3 Am J Int'l L)
Jean Galbraith
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, National Security Law
Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons

Repository Citation
Galbraith, Jean, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law (112:3 Am J
Int'l L)" (2018). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2003.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2003

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Copyright © 2018 by The American Society of International Law

CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY JEAN GALBRAITH*
In this section:
• Congress Enacts the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, Reshaping
U.S. Law Governing Cross-Border Access to Data
• Trump Administration Expels Russian Diplomats and Imposes Russia-Related Sanctions
• U.S. Supreme Court Holds that a Provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Does Not Lift Immunity from Attachment of Iranian Artifacts
• U.S. Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Imports Go into Effect, Leading to Trade Disputes
• United States Moves Forward with Tariffs and Requests WTO Consultations in
Response to Certain Trade Practices by China
• Developments Relating to U.S. Trade Negotiations—KORUS, NAFTA, and Trade
Promotion Authority
• President Trump Withdraws the United States from the Iran Deal and Announces the
Reimposition of Sanctions
• United States Bombs Syrian Government Facilities in Response to Chemical Weapons
Use

* Maura Douglas, Patricia Liverpool, David Peters, Sabrina Ruchelli, Jenna Smith, Kristen Dewilde, and Brian
Yeh contributed to the preparation of this section.
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Congress Enacts the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, Reshaping U.S. Law
Governing Cross-Border Access to Data
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.61

On March 22, 2018, Congress passed a $1.3 trillion omnibus spending bill that President
Trump signed into law the following day, thus narrowly avoiding a government shutdown.1
Included within the voluminous bill is the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD)
Act,2 which enhances both the United States’ and foreign nations’ access to cross-border electronic data for law enforcement purposes.3
Prompted by the challenge of collecting “electronic evidence necessary to enforce
essential laws in an increasingly international and digital age,” the CLOUD Act makes
two distinct yet related changes to the law governing cross-border access to data in
criminal investigations. 4 First, the Act amends the Stored Communications Act
(SCA)—a “dense and confusing” statutory scheme that protects “the privacy of stored
Internet communications”5—by “explicitly requiring providers subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to produce data pursuant to appropriate SCA process, even if
the provider chooses to store that data outside the United States.”6 The SCA had been
passed in 1986 as part of a larger bill, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA).7 As a second change, the CLOUD Act amends several other provisions of the
ECPA to create a framework that allows U.S. service providers to disclose U.S.-stored
data to certain foreign countries pursuant to lawful foreign orders. 8 According to
Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard Downing, the provisions together
“build a new framework for effective, efﬁcient cross-border access to data that protects
both legitimate privacy interests and our public safety and national security, and beneﬁts
U.S. business interests as well.”9
1
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018) [hereinafter 2018
Appropriations Act]; see also Julie Hirschﬁeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, Trump Signs Spending Bill, Reversing
Veto Threat and Avoiding Government Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/23/us/politics/trump-veto-spending-bill.html.
2
2018 Appropriations Act, supra note 1, div. 5; see also Robyn Greene, Somewhat Improved, the CLOUD Act Still
Poses a Threat to Privacy and Human Rights, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 23, 2018), at https://www.justsecurity.org/
54242/improved-cloud-act-poses-threat-privacy-human-rights (observing that, as a “quintessential must-pass
bill,” the “2,232 page omnibus bill to fund the government” was used “as a vehicle to quietly pass through the
controversial CLOUD Act”).
3
Data Stored Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection in the Digital Era: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 15 (2017) (statement of Richard W. Downing, Acting Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Downing Testimony].
4
Id. at 7.
5
Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004).
6
Downing Testimony, supra note 3, at 11.
7
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860 (1986); see also Kerr,
supra note 5, at 1208 n.2 (noting the various names used for the SCA over time).
8
Downing Testimony, supra note 3, at 13.
9
Id. at 2.
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The Obama administration ﬁrst introduced draft legislation for what would become the
CLOUD Act on July 15, 2016.10 Originally, the proposed legislation did not include language

addressing how the SCA applied to data stored abroad by U.S. communications service providers. But the day before the draft legislation was to be released, the Second Circuit held in
Microsoft Corp. v. United States that the SCA did not authorize the issuance of a warrant to
obtain data held by a U.S. provider where this data was stored abroad—in this case, in
Ireland.11 Even though the Department of Justice petitioned for and obtained Supreme
Court review of the decision,12 the Microsoft holding prompted the Obama and then the
Trump administrations to seek a legislative ﬁx. As Assistant Attorney General Peter Kadzik
explained in a cover letter accompanying the initial draft legislation:
Yesterday, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Microsoft
Corp. v. United States that section 2703 of ECPA does not authorize our courts to issue
and enforce warrants served on U.S. providers to obtain electronic communications
stored abroad. If the decision stands[,] . . . [t]he Administration intends to promptly
submit legislation to Congress to address the signiﬁcant public safety implications of
the Microsoft decision. This will be a necessary addition to the proposal that we are
submitting today.13
The CLOUD Act—enacted a mere three weeks after the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Microsoft Corp., but before a decision was handed down14—resolved the issue of
the SCA’s application to data stored abroad by U.S. providers and thus mooted the pending
controversy.15 Congress added a provision to the SCA clarifying that:
10
Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Joseph R. Biden, President,
U.S. Senate 3–4 (July 15, 2016), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2994379-2016-7-15US-UK-Biden-With-Enclosures.html#document/p1 [https://perma.cc/7WGW-5D6G] [hereinafter Kadzik
Letter]; see also David Kris, U.S. Government Presents Draft Legislation for Cross-Border Data Requests, LAWFARE
(July 16, 2016), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-government-presents-draft-legislation-cross-border-datarequests.
11
829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016).
12
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (cert. granted).
13
Kadzik Letter, supra note 10, at 2–3; see also Downing Testimony, supra note 3, at 2 (including within the
proposal to Congress “legislation to ﬁx the problems created by the Microsoft decision”).
14
See Nina Totenberg, A Needle in a Legal Haystack Could Sink a Major Supreme Court Privacy Case, NPR (Mar.
28, 2018), at https://www.npr.org/2018/03/28/597444394/a-needle-in-a-legal-haystack-could-sink-a-majorsupreme-court-privacy-case (noting that “a Congress famous for gridlock passed legislation to modernize” the
SCA “just three weeks after the Supreme Court argument”).
15
Following the passage of the CLOUD Act, the U.S. Department of Justice obtained a new warrant for the
Microsoft data stored abroad. See Motion to Vacate the Judgment of the Court of Appeals and Remand the Case
with Directions to Dismiss as Moot, 2, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2 (Mar. 30, 2018). The Solicitor
General then petitioned the Court to vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case with directions to dismiss as moot because “Microsoft’s sole objection—that the prior warrant was impermissibly extraterritorial—no longer applies.” Id. at 1–2. Microsoft did not oppose the government’s request, “provided that the
Court similarly vacates the opinion of the magistrate judge (as adopted by the District Court) that the Second
Circuit reversed. . . .” Response to the United States’ Motion to Vacate and Remand with Directions to
Dismiss as Moot, 2, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2 (Apr. 3, 2018).
On April 17, the Court issued a per curiam opinion agreeing “[n]o live dispute remains between the parties” and
“[t]his case, therefore, has become moot.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1188 (2018) (per
curiam). As such, the Court ruled “the judgment on review is accordingly vacated, and the case is remanded” to the
court of appeals “with instructions ﬁrst to vacate the District Court’s contempt ﬁnding and its denial of Microsoft’s
motion to quash, then to direct the District Court to dismiss the case as moot.” Id.
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A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall comply
with the obligations of this chapter to preserve, backup, or disclose the contents of a wire or
electronic communication and any record or other information pertaining to a customer or
subscriber within such provider’s possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such
communication, record, or other information is located within or outside of the United States.16
Congress also created a limited mechanism for providers to challenge these warrants where
applying the SCA to data stored overseas might create “conﬂicting legal obligations” by
requiring “disclosure of electronic data that foreign law prohibits communications-service
providers from disclosing.”17 At present, this mechanism is a nascent one. It applies only
where “qualifying foreign governments” are concerned, with such governments deﬁned as
ones with whom the United States has reached executive agreements on access to data.18
As discussed below, no such agreements presently exist.19 If such agreements are reached
in the future, then, following a motion by the communications service provider, a reviewing
court may modify or quash a warrant
only if the court ﬁnds that—(i) the required disclosure would cause the provider to violate the laws of a qualifying foreign government; (ii) based on the totality of the circumstances, the interests of justice dictate that the legal process should be modiﬁed or
quashed; and (iii) the customer or subscriber is not a United States person and does
not reside in the United States.20
In determining whether “the interests of justice dictate that the legal process should be modiﬁed or quashed,” Congress requires a reviewing court to conduct a “comity analysis.”21 The
reviewing court “shall take into account, as appropriate,” eight enumerated factors, including
“the interests of the United States,” “the interests of the qualifying foreign government in
preventing any prohibited disclosure,” and the “likelihood, extent, and nature of penalties
to the provider or any employees of the provider as a result of inconsistent legal requirements
imposed on the provider.”22
In addition to this limited mechanism, the CLOUD Act speciﬁes that it does not “modify
or otherwise affect the common law standards governing the availability or application of
comity analysis.”23 It remains to be seen whether challenges to particular warrants based
16
2018 Appropriations Act, supra note 1, div. 5, § 103(a)(1) (to be codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. § 2713) (emphasis
added). Downing’s testimony indicates that the Department of Justice views this language as applicable to “providers subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” See Downing Testimony, supra note 3, at 11.
17
2018 Appropriations Act, supra note 1, at div. 5, § 102(5). Downing testiﬁed that as of 2016 “[the
Department of Justice] is not aware of any instance in which a provider has informed the Department or a
court that production pursuant to the SCA of data stored outside the United States would place the provider
in conﬂict with local law.” Downing Testimony, supra note 3, at 11.
18
2018 Appropriations Act, supra note 1, at div. 5, § 103(b) (to be codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)).
19
See infra notes 29–48 and accompanying text.
20
2018 Appropriations Act, supra note 1, at div. 5, § 103(b) (to be codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)).
21
Id.
22
Id. The mechanism to challenge extraterritorial warrants was a late addition to the CLOUD Act—the draft
legislation introduced by both the Obama and Trump administrations did not include the provisions establishing
it. See Kadzik Letter, supra note 10, at 4 (failing to include such provisions in draft legislation); see also Downing
Testimony, supra note 3, at 24 (same).
23
2018 Appropriations Act, supra note 1, at div. 5, § 103(c).
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on common-law comity principles will be made going forward, particularly in the wake of the
recent implementation of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation.24
Besides clarifying the scope of U.S. law enforcement’s authority to access data stored
abroad, the CLOUD Act also creates a framework to facilitate access by certain foreign governments to data stored by U.S. service providers in the United States. Kadzik explained the
need for such a framework when introducing the draft legislation:
Foreign governments investigating criminal activities abroad increasingly require access
to electronic evidence from U.S. companies that provide electronic communications services to millions of their citizens and residents. Such data is often stored or accessible only
in the United States, where U.S. law, including the ECPA, limits the companies’ ability
to disclose it.25
According to Kadzik and others,26 the current method for processing requests by foreign governments for U.S.-stored data—the use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs)—is
too labor intensive and time consuming to handle the “signiﬁcant increases in the volume
and complexity of requests . . . in the Internet Age.”27
The CLOUD Act thus allows U.S. providers to disclose data to a limited set of foreign governments who are targeting the accounts of non-U.S. persons located outside the United
States.28 A foreign government is eligible for such disclosures under the CLOUD Act only
after entering into an “executive agreement” with the U.S. government.29 Moreover, the
attorney general must, with the concurrence of the secretary of state, submit a written certiﬁcation to Congress that the “executive agreement” satisﬁes four statutory requirements set
forth in the newly enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2523.30
24

See Jennifer Daskal, Microsoft Ireland, the CLOUD Act, and International Lawmaking 2.0, 71 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 9, 11–13 (2018) (noting potential tensions between this EU regulation and warrants that may be issued
pursuant to the CLOUD Act).
25
Kadzik Letter, supra note 10, at 1.
26
Downing testiﬁed that the MLAT process is “not devised to handle the growing demands for digital evidence.
Already, the Department faces signiﬁcant challenges in responding to the enormous volume of foreign demands
with the requisite speed.” Downing Testimony, supra note 3, at 7. For further discussion on how MLATs operate
and the need for reform, see generally Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Mutual Legal Assistance in an Era of
Globalized Communications: The Analogy to the Visa Waiver Program, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 687 (2016);
Peter Swire, Justin Hemmings & Suzanne Vergnolle, A Mutual Legal Assistance Case Study: The United States and
France, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 323 (2017).
27
Kadzik Letter, supra note 10, at 1; see also Swire & Hemmings, supra note 26, at 700 (noting that on average
the MLAT process takes approximately ten months to execute valid electronic evidence requests).
28
See Downing Testimony, supra note 3, at 13. The CLOUD Act does not require disclosure as a matter of U.S.
law, but where applicable it means that U.S. law will no longer operate as a bar to disclosure. See id.
29
2018 Appropriations Act, supra note 1, at div. 5, § 104 (to be codiﬁed in various sections of 28 U.S.C.); see
also STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT ON CROSS-BORDER DATA SHARING UNDER
THE CLOUD ACT 15–16 (Apr. 23, 2018), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45173.pdf (concluding that
the CLOUD Act “authorizes” such executive agreements and thus serves as a “source of authority” for the executive
branch to enter into them). MLATs remain the vehicle for processing cross-border data requests for those nations
that do not enter into the bilateral data-sharing agreements described in the CLOUD Act. See Downing Testimony,
supra note 3, at 9.
30
2018 Appropriations Act, supra note 1, at div. 5, § 105 (to be codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. § 2523). While the
attorney general’s determination “shall not be subject to judicial or administrative review,” the CLOUD Act creates
expedited legislative procedures that Congress could use in passing a joint resolution of disapproval blocking the
agreement within 180 days of the certiﬁcation’s submission to Congress. See id.
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First, the attorney general must certify that “the domestic law of the foreign government,
including the implementation of that law, affords robust substantive and procedural protections for privacy and civil liberties in light of the data collection and activities of the foreign
government that will be subject to the agreement.”31 Further, the statute enumerates speciﬁc
“factors to be met in making such a determination,” including whether the foreign government “demonstrates respect for the rule of law and principles of nondiscrimination” and
“adheres to applicable international human rights obligations and commitments or demonstrates respect for international universal human rights,” among others.32
Second, the attorney general must also certify that “the foreign government has adopted
appropriate procedures to minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information concerning United States persons subject to the agreement.”33 Third, “the terms of the
agreement shall not create any obligation that providers be capable of decrypting data or limitation that prevents providers from decrypting data.”34
Fourth, and ﬁnally, the attorney general must certify that the executive agreement requires
“any order that is subject to the agreement” to comply with several enumerated restrictions.35
Among other requirements, the agreement must provide that “the foreign government may
not intentionally target a United States person or a person located in the United States, and
shall adopt targeting procedures designed to meet this requirement.”36 Further, an order
issued pursuant to the agreement “shall be for the purpose of obtaining information relating
to . . . serious crime” and “shall be subject to review or oversight by a court, judge, magistrate,
or other independent authority prior to, or in proceedings regarding, enforcement of the
order.”37 And, the “United States Government shall reserve the right to render the agreement
inapplicable as to any order for which the United States Government concludes the agreement may not properly be invoked.”38
According to the executive branch, the CLOUD Act “meet[s] the legitimate public safety
needs of other countries,” while “establish[ing] adequate baselines for protecting privacy and
civil liberties.”39 But the changes the CLOUD Act makes to the law of cross-border access to
data has engendered substantial disagreement among scholars, industry, and civil liberty organizations as to whether the Act “is good for privacy and human rights.”40 On the one hand,
organizations including the Electronic Frontier Foundation and ACLU campaigned against
the CLOUD Act on the grounds that the bill “fails to protect the rights of Americans and
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Downing Testimony, supra note 3, at 13–14.
40
Jennifer Daskal & Peter Swire, Why the CLOUD Act is Good for Privacy and Human Rights, LAWFARE (Mar. 14,
2018), at https://lawfareblog.com/why-cloud-act-good-privacy-and-human-rights. Criticism was also levied at the
process of the CLOUD Act’s enactment: “It was never . . . marked up by any committee in either the House or the
Senate. . . . It was robbed of a stand-alone ﬂoor vote because Congressional leadership decided, behind closed
doors, to attach this unvetted, unrelated data bill to the $1.3 trillion government spending bill.” David Ruiz,
Responsibility Deﬂected, the CLOUD Act Passes, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 22, 2018), at https://www.
eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/responsibility-deﬂected-cloud-act-passes.
32
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individuals abroad, and would place too much authority in the hands of the executive branch
with few mechanisms to prevent abuse.”41 On the other hand, leading U.S. tech companies
voiced public support for the CLOUD Act’s passage, arguing that it “reﬂects a growing consensus in favor of protecting Internet users around the world and provides a logical solution
for governing cross-border access to data.”42 And privacy scholars Jennifer Daskal and Peter
Swire argue that the CLOUD Act improves “privacy and civil liberties protections compared
to a world without such legislation” by “set[ting] critically important baseline substantive and
procedural protections, while doing so in a way that is achievable and understandable to other
rights-respecting nations.”43
The effect on digital privacy may be felt sooner rather than later, as the CLOUD Act’s
enactment paves the way for the ﬁnalization of a bilateral data-sharing agreement between
the United States and the United Kingdom. Prompted by the need to address the “untenable
situation in which . . . Britain cannot quickly obtain data for domestic probes because it happens to be held by companies in the United States,” undisclosed negotiations between the two
allies were underway at least by February of 2016.44 American and British ofﬁcials alike held
up the potential U.S.–U.K. agreement as both a reason for passing the bill and a model for
future bilateral executive agreements. As Downing testiﬁed during congressional hearings on
the CLOUD Act:
Under this approach, the United States and a foreign government can negotiate a bilateral
agreement setting forth the terms for cross-border access to data, but only with those
countries who share the United States’ commitment to the rule of law and respect for
privacy and civil liberties. . . . The United States has for some time been working on a
proposed agreement of this sort with the United Kingdom, which has made clear that its
inability to access data from U.S. providers in an efﬁcient and effective way poses a very
serious threat to public safety and national security in the United Kingdom. . . . If the
approach proves successful, we would consider it for other appropriate countries as
well.45
The CLOUD Act’s sponsor, Senator Orrin Hatch, called the U.S.–U.K. agreement “a model
for future agreements between the United States and other countries” and advocated for
41
CLOUD ACT Coalition Letter from ACLU et al. to U.S. Members of Congress 1 (Mar. 12, 2018), available
at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁeld_document/cloud_act_coalition_letter_3-8_clean.pdf.
42
Letter from Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft & Oath, to Doug Collins, Darrell Issa, Tom Marino,
Hakeem Jeffries, Suzan DelBene & John Rutherford, Representatives, U.S. Congress (Feb. 6, 2018), available
at https://blogs.microsoft.com/datalaw/wp-content/uploads/sites/149/2018/02/Tech-Companies-Letter-ofSupport-for-House-CLOUD-Act-020618.pdf.
43
Daskal & Swire, supra note 40.
44
Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, The British Want to Come to America—with Wiretap Orders and Search
Warrants, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-britishwant-to-come-to-america–with-wiretap-orders-and-search-warrants/2016/02/04/b351ce9e-ca86-11e5-a7b25a2f824b02c9_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4649759d38ea; see also Andrew Keane Woods, The USUK Data Deal, LAWFARE (Feb. 10, 2016), at https://lawfareblog.com/us-uk-data-deal (arguing that “an agreement,
with the right safeguards, can be seen as critical for the preserving [of] the internet as we know it, and over the long
term a signiﬁcant victory for privacy”).
45
Downing Testimony, supra note 3, at 13–14; see also Kadzik Letter, supra note 10, at 1 (“The legislative
proposal is necessary to implement a potential bilateral agreement between the United Kingdom and United
States.”).
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“[e]xpeditiously implementing similar agreements with the European Union and other
allies. . . .”46 British ofﬁcials also voiced strong support for the CLOUD Act, with Prime
Minister Theresa May stressing the “great importance of the legislation” to President
Trump,47 and U.K. Deputy National Security Advisor Paddy McGuinness testifying in
support of the legislation in committee hearings in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate.48
Despite this public support and the Act’s passage, a draft of the U.S.–U.K. agreement had
not been released as of May 31, 2018, and the attorney general had not submitted the
necessary written certiﬁcation to Congress.

Trump Administration Expels Russian Diplomats and Imposes Russia-Related Sanctions
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.59

During the spring of 2018, the Trump administration expelled sixty Russian intelligence
ofﬁcers and diplomats and also imposed sanctions against various Russian individuals and
companies.1 These actions responded to a range of actions attributed to Russia, including
a poisoning on U.K. soil, its efforts to destabilize Ukraine, its support of the Assad regime
in Syria, and various cyber activities.
On March 4, 2018, a military-grade nerve agent was used against a former Russian double agent, now a British citizen, and his daughter in the U.K. city of Salisbury.2 British
Prime Minister Theresa May attributed this act to Russia, calling it an “unlawful use of
46

Ofﬁce of Sen. Orrin Hatch Press Release, Hatch Previews CLOUD Act: Legislation to Solve the Problem of
Cross-Border Data Requests (Feb. 5, 2018), at https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/2/hatchpreviews-cloud-act-legislation-to-solve-the-problem-of-cross-border-data-requests [https://perma.cc/CEK2PKBN].
47
British Prime Minister’s Off. Press Release, PM Call with President Trump: 6 February 2018 (Feb. 6, 2018),
at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-president-trump-6-february-2018 [https://perma.cc/
R83W-HUFR].
48
See Data Stored Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection in the Digital Era: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 15 (June 15, 2017) (statement of Paddy McGuinness, U.K. Deputy
National Security Advisor); Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Across Borders: Facilitating Cooperation and
Protecting Rights Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (May 24, 2017, rescheduled from May 10,
2017) (statement of Paddy McGuiness, U.K. Deputy National Security Advisor).
1
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Holding Russia Accountable for Its Destabilizing Behavior (Mar. 26, 2018),
at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/03/279552.htm [https://perma.cc/2LQF-ZY6R] [hereinafter Mar. 26
State Press Release]; U.S. Dep’t of Treasury Press Release, Treasury Designates Russian Oligarchs, Ofﬁcials, and
Entities in Response to Worldwide Malign Activity (Apr. 6, 2018), at https://home.treasury.gov/news/featuredstories/treasury-designates-russian-oligarchs-ofﬁcials-and-entities-in-response-to [https://perma.cc/42Q7-ZG2B]
[hereinafter Apr. 6 Treasury Press Release]. For an account of prior responses by the administration to Russian
behavior, including other sanctions imposed earlier in the spring, see Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the
United States, 113 AJIL 296 (2018).
2
Guy Faulconbridge & Michael Holden, Explainer: The Poisoning of Former Russian Double Agent Sergei
Skripal, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2018), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-explainer/explainer-thepoisoning-of-former-russian-double-agent-sergei-skripal-idUSKCN1GP2CH.
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force by the Russian state against the United Kingdom.” 3 The United States joined
Britain, France, and various other countries in condemning Russia’s actions. 4 On
March 26, 2018, the Trump administration ordered the expulsion of twelve Russian intelligence ofﬁcers and forty-eight other Russian ofﬁcials, as well as the closure of the Russian
consulate in Seattle.5 The White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders stated,
“The United States takes this action in conjunction with our NATO allies and partners
around the world in response to Russia’s use of a military-grade chemical weapon on the
soil of the United Kingdom, the latest in its ongoing pattern of destabilizing activities
around the world.”6
In response, Russia denied responsibility for the use of the nerve agent, expelled
sixty American diplomats and a number of diplomats from other countries, and
ordered the closure of the U.S. consulate in St. Petersburg. 7 Sanders denounced
this response:
Russia’s action today to expel American diplomats marks a further deterioration in the
United States-Russia relationship. The expulsion of undeclared Russian intelligence ofﬁcers by the United States and more than two dozen partner nations and NATO allies
earlier this week was an appropriate response to the Russian attack on the soil of the
United Kingdom. Russia’s response was not unanticipated, and the United States will
deal with it.8
Separately, on April 6, 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on
seven Russian oligarchs and several of the companies they own or control, seventeen
Russian government ofﬁcials, and a Russian weapons trading company and its subsidiary.9
These sanctions were implemented pursuant to Executive Orders 13661 and 13662,
“Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine,” orders
codiﬁed and amended by §§ 222 and 223 of the Countering America’s Adversaries
3
Prime Minster Theresa May, Statement to the House of Commons Following the Salisbury Incident (Mar.
14, 2018), at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-salisbury-incidentresponse-14-march-2018; see also Ashley Deeks, Prime Minister May’s Use-of-Force Claim: Clarifying the Law
That Governs the U.K’s Options, LAWFARE (Mar. 13, 2018), https://lawfareblog.com/prime-minister-mays-useforce-claim-clarifying-law-governs-uks-options (discussing the international legal implications of this
determination).
4
Katie Rogers & Eileen Sullivan, Trump and Western Allies Expel Scores of Russians in Sweeping Rebuke Over
U.K. Poisoning, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/world/europe/trump-russia-diplomats-expulsion.html.
5
Mar. 26 State Press Release, supra note 1.
6
White House Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary on the Expulsion of Russian Intelligence
Ofﬁcers (Mar. 26, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-expulsion-russian-intelligence-ofﬁcers [https://perma.cc/8VPQ-5YHU].
7
UN Security Council Press Release, Full Investigation Must Swiftly Identify, Apprehend Perpetrators,
Security Council Hears During Heated Discussion on Salisbury Chemical Attack, UN Press Release
SC/13279 (Apr. 5, 2018), at https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13279.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/5ZZ86NPF]; Andrew Higgins, Expelling Diplomats, a Furious Kremlin Escalates a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29,
2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/world/europe/russia-expels-diplomats.html.
8
White House Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Russia’s Expulsion of American
Diplomats (Mar. 29, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretaryregarding-russias-expulsion-american-diplomats [https://perma.cc/Z5LK-NGAF].
9
Apr. 6 Treasury Press Release, supra note 1. The Department of the Treasury’s press release did not speciﬁcally
reference the Salisbury poisoning in announcing the sanctions. See id.
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Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).10 The sanctions freeze any assets under U.S. jurisdiction of the designated individuals and entities and prohibit U.S. individuals and entities
from dealing with them.11 Some of these individuals had been previously included on a
list of oligarchs issued in January by the Department of Treasury pursuant to an obligation
imposed by CAATSA.12
In announcing the sanctions, Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin explained:
“The Russian government operates for the disproportionate beneﬁt of oligarchs and government elites. . . . The Russian government engages in a range of malign activity around
the globe, including continuing to occupy Crimea and instigate violence in eastern
Ukraine, supplying the Assad regime with material and weaponry as they bomb their
own civilians, attempting to subvert Western democracies, and malicious cyber activities.
Russian oligarchs and elites who proﬁt from this corrupt system will no longer be insulated from the consequences of their government’s destabilizing activities.”13
The expulsion and sanctions have been accompanied by some mixed messages from
the Trump administration regarding its approach to Russia. In March, President Trump congratulated President Putin on his reelection,14 prompting Senator John McCain to respond
that “[a]n American president does not lead the Free World by congratulating dictators on
winning sham elections.”15 In April, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley
announced that additional sanctions would be imposed against Russian companies that
helped facilitate Syria’s use of chemical weapons.16 Although the Trump administration
had condemned Russia’s role in relation to Syria’s use of chemical weapons,17 it backed
away from Haley’s announcement.18 More generally, shadowing the Trump administration’s
relationship with Russia are concerns about Russian interference in the 2016 presidential
10
Id. (also referencing Executive Order 13582 as an authority); see also Countering America’s Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, §§ 222, 223, 131 Stat. 886, 906-08 (2017).
11
Apr. 6 Treasury Press Release, supra note 1 (further providing a wind-down period).
12
Id.; see also Galbraith, supra note 1, at 301–03 (describing this list and the CAATSA provision giving rise to it).
13
Apr. 6 Treasury Press Release, supra note 1.
14
White House Press Release, Readout of President Donald J. Trump’s Call With President Vladimir Putin of
Russia (Mar. 20, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/readout-president-donald-jtrumps-call-president-vladimir-putin-russia-3 [https://perma.cc/SDV3-PSYA].
15
Ofﬁce of Senator John McCain Press Release, Statement by SASC Chairman John McCain on President
Trump Congratulating Vladimir Putin (Mar. 20, 2018), at https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
press-releases?ID=61F7FD60-671F-4364-8297-1AB43F099405.
16
Transcript: U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley on “Face the Nation,” April 15, 2018, CBS NEWS (Apr. 15, 2018), at
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-u-n-ambassador-nikki-haley-on-face-the-nation-april-15-2018.
17
White House Press Release, United States Government Assessment of the Assad Regime’s Chemical
Weapons Use (Apr. 13, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/united-states-governmentassessment-assad-regimes-chemical-weapons-use [https://perma.cc/553G-RJDC]. Trump, in subsequent tweets,
declared Putin and Russia responsible and promised there would be a “[b]ig price” to pay. See Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 8, 2018, 6:00 AM), at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
982966315467116544; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 8, 2018, 6:04 AM), at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/982967389028569088.
18
Peter Baker, Julie Davis & Maggie Haberman, Sanctions Flap Erupts Into Open Conﬂict Between Haley and
White House, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/world/europe/trump-nikkihaley-russia-sanctions.html (describing a back-and-forth in which a White House ofﬁcial characterized Haley as
experiencing “momentary confusion” with respect to her announcement of additional sanctions and Haley
responded that “I don’t get confused”).
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election, in addition to ongoing investigations and litigation regarding any connections
between the Trump campaign and Russia.19

STATE JURISDICTION AND IMMUNITY
U.S. Supreme Court Holds that a Provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Does Not Lift
Immunity from Attachment of Iranian Artifacts
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.60

The U.S. Supreme Court recently held unanimously that § 1610(g) of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not lift the immunity from attachment of certain artifacts belonging to Iran.1 The case, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, stemmed from the petitioners’ attempt to satisfy a prior judgment against Iran for injuries sustained in Hamas
suicide bombings in Jerusalem in 1997.2
Subject to exceptions, the FSIA “grants foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities immunity from suit in the United States (called jurisdictional immunity) and grants their
property immunity from attachment and execution in satisfaction of judgments against
them.”3 In Rubin, the petitioners sought to attach Iranian property in order to satisfy a judgment they had previously received under § 1605A of the FSIA, which provides an exception
to jurisdictional immunity for acts of terrorism attributable in speciﬁed ways to state sponsors
of terrorism. Speciﬁcally, the petitioners sought to seize Iranian artifacts known as the
Persepolis Collection in the University of Chicago’s possession.4 The collection, which consists of approximately 30,000 ancient clay tablets and fragments with writings, was loaned to
the University of Chicago by Iran in 1937.5
19
U.S. Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller was appointed in May 2017 to investigate possible Russian interference and links to the Trump campaign. Rod J. Rosenstein, Acting Attorney General, Order. No. 3915-2017 re
Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and
Related Matters (May 17, 2017), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/ﬁle/967231/download
[https://perma.cc/6M9E-T4ZV]. On February 16, 2018, thirteen Russian nationals and three companies were
indicted. Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF, 2018 WL
914777 (D.D.C. ﬁled Feb. 16, 2018), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4380504/TheSpecial-Counsel-s-Indictment-of-the-Internet.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6J6-GH7M]. On April 20, 2018, the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) ﬁled a lawsuit against, among other persons and entities, the Russian
government and the Trump campaign, alleging, among other things, that the campaign conspired with Russia in
relation to hacked DNC emails. Complaint, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Russ. Fed’n, No. 1-18-cv-03501, 2018
WL 1885868 (S.D.N.Y. ﬁled Apr. 20, 2018).
1
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 538 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 816, 827 (2018). Justice Kagan did not participate
in the decision. Id. at 827.
2
Id. at 820–21. In 2003, a federal district court granted a default judgment against Iran under the prior statesponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA’s establishment of jurisdictional immunity. Campuzano v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260, 269–70 (D.D.C. 2003). The court subsequently granted the petitioners’ motion to convert the judgment to one under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, a more expansive exception to immunity for state-sponsored terrorism passed by Congress in 2008. 563 F. Supp. 2d 38, 39 n.3 (D.D.C. 2008). As part
of their lengthy attempt to satisfy the judgment, petitioners sought to attach the artifacts at issue in this case. See
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Islam, 830 F.3d 470, 474–75 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the procedural history).
3
Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 820–21 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1609).
4
Id. at 819–21.
5
Id. at 821.
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Section 1610 delineates exceptions to the FSIA’s default of immunity from attachment or
execution for state property. Sections 1610(a), (b), and (d) permit attachment of property
used for commercial activity under certain conditions.6 For example, § 1610(a) provides
that the “property in the United States of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial activity
in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment . . . if . . . (7) the judgment relates
to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605A. . . .”7 Earlier in the
litigation, petitioners had unsuccessfully argued that the Persepolis Collection was used for
commercial activity for purposes of § 1610(a)(7).8 By the time the Supreme Court heard the
case on the merits, however, petitioners were limited to seeking the Persepolis Collection
under a different sub-section—§ 1610(g)—which they argued provided a freestanding exception to immunity for the property of a state against whom a judgment has been entered under
§ 1605A.
Added to the FSIA in 2008, § 1610(g) provides:
(g) Property in certain actions.
(1) In general. . . . [T]he property of a foreign state against which a judgment is
entered under section 1605A, and the property of an agency or instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a separate juridical entity or is an
interest held directly or indirectly in a separate juridical entity, is subject to
attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon that judgment as provided in this section, regardless of–
(A) the level of economic control over the property by the government of
the foreign state;
(B) whether the proﬁts of the property go to that government;
(C) the degree to which ofﬁcials of that government manage the property
or otherwise control its daily affairs;
(D) whether that government is the sole beneﬁciary in interest of the property; or
(E) whether establishing the property as a separate entity would entitle the
foreign state to beneﬁts in United States courts while avoiding its
obligations.9
In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor issued in February 2018, the Supreme Court held
unanimously that § 1610(g) did not create an independent exception to the immunity of
state property for parties seeking to satisfy a § 1605A judgment. Instead, “[a] judgment holder
seeking to take advantage of § 1610(g)(1) must identify a basis under one of § 1610’s express
immunity-abrogating provisions to attach and execute against a relevant property.”10
6

28 U.S.C. § 1610.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).
8
Rubin, 830 F.3d at 479 (rejecting arguments that “a third party’s commercial use of the property triggers
§ 1610(a)” and also expressing skepticism that “the University’s academic study of the Persepolis Collection counts
as a commercial use”); see also 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017) (granting certiorari only with respect to the interpretation of
§ 1610(g)).
9
28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1).
10
Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 824.
7
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In reaching this holding, the Court observed that § 1610(g)(1) was added to the FSIA in
2008 to abrogate in part the Court’s earlier decision in First National City Bank v. Banco Para
el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec).11 Bancec had established a presumption that, under the
FSIA, a foreign state’s agencies and instrumentalities with separate juridical status could not
be deemed liable for the state’s acts.12 The federal appellate courts then developed a ﬁve-factor
test to determine when this presumption would be overcome.13 In Rubin, the Supreme Court
reasoned that, in § 1610(g)(1), Congress had clearly rejected Bancec and its subsequent reﬁnement as to the satisfaction of judgments entered for state sponsorship of terrorism under
§ 1605A.14 This is evident, noted the Court, because § 1610(g)(1) provides that state agencies and instrumentalities are liable “regardless of” ﬁve listed factors which, the Court noted,
resemble “almost verbatim” the prior ﬁve-factor test.15
The Court then asked whether, in addition to abrogating Bancec, “§ 1610(g) does something more . . . [and] provides an independent exception to immunity so that it allows a
§ 1605A judgment holder to attach and execute against any property of the foreign
state.”16 Based on statutory text and historical practice, the Court concluded that the
answer was no:
Section 1610(g)(1) provides that certain property will be “subject to attachment in aid of
execution . . . as provided in this section.” (Emphasis added.) The most natural reading is
that “this section” refers to § 1610 as a whole, so that § 1610(g)(1) will govern the attachment and execution of property that is exempted from the grant of immunity as provided
elsewhere in § 1610.
...
[Unlike § 1610 (a)(7) and other sub-sections of § 1610, § 1610(g)] conspicuously lacks
the textual markers “shall not be immune” or “notwithstanding any other provision of
law” that would have shown that it serves as an independent avenue for abrogation of
immunity.
...
If the Court were to conclude that § 1610(g) establishes a basis for the withdrawal of
property immunity any time a plaintiff holds a judgment under § 1605A, each of [various
other § 1610 sub-sections] would be rendered superﬂuous because a judgment holder
could always turn to § 1610(g), regardless of whether the conditions of any other provisions were met.
The Court’s interpretation of § 1610(g) is also consistent with the historical practice of
rescinding attachment and execution immunity primarily in the context of a foreign
state’s commercial acts.17
11

Id. at 823.
First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 628 (1983).
13
Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 823.
14
Id.
15
28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1); Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 823.
16
Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 823.
17
Id. at 823–25.
12
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The Court thus held that parties who seek to satisfy a judgment under § 1605A’s statesponsored terrorism exception to jurisdictional immunity cannot rely on § 1610(g), but
must instead satisfy one of § 1610’s other immunity-abrogating provisions. In an amicus
brief ﬁled in support of Iran, the United States emphasized that this reading of § 1610(g)
was consistent with broader U.S. policy interests. The U.S. brief explained:
Even in the context of actions against state sponsors of terrorism, execution could provoke serious foreign policy consequences, including impacts on the treatment of the
United States’ own property abroad. . . .
The property at issue here consists of ancient Persian artifacts, documenting a unique
aspect of Iran’s cultural heritage, that were lent to a U.S. institution in the 1930s for academic study. Iran has never used the Collection for commercial activity in the United
States . . . . Execution against such unique cultural artifacts could cause affront and reciprocity problems that are different in kind from execution under any other provision of
Section 1610.18
Although the Court did not discuss these policy interests, it emphasized the “delicate balance that Congress struck in enacting the FSIA.”19

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
U.S. Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Imports Go into Effect, Leading to Trade Disputes
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.66

Consistent with President Trump’s America First trade agenda, his administration
imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports in early March of 2018, triggering various
responses and challenges. Countries have followed through on early objections to the tariffs
through retaliatory tariffs and challenges in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and steel
importers have challenged the legality of these tariffs under U.S. domestic law. At the same
time, these tariffs have been revised multiple times, either to delay the implementation period
for certain countries seeking exemptions or to permanently grant exemptions to countries
who reached negotiated arrangements with the United States.
On March 8, 2018, the United States imposed a ten percent tariff on imported aluminum,1 and a twenty-ﬁve percent tariff on imported steel.2 These tariffs were imposed pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,3 which allows the president to adjust
imports once “the [Secretary of Commerce] ﬁnds that an article is being imported into the
United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the
18
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran at
31–32, 538 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) (No. 16-534).
19
Rubin, 138 S. Ct. at 825.
1
Proclamation No. 9704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (Mar. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Aluminum Tariff].
2
Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Steel Tariff].
3
19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012).
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national security.”4 As originally enacted, the tariffs were to go into effect March 23, 2018,5
with built-in temporary exemptions for imports from Canada and Mexico.6
In addition to initial exemptions for Canada and Mexico, Trump recognized that “[the
United States] has important security relationships with some countries whose exports of
steel articles to the United States weaken our internal economy and thereby threaten to impair
the national security,” and explicitly encouraged any such country to engage in negotiations
to ﬁnd alternatives to the tariffs.7 Following the announcement of the tariffs, various U.S.
trading partners sought to take advantage of this option.8
On March 22, 2018, the day before the tariffs were originally to go into effect, Trump
signed Proclamation 97109 and Proclamation 9711,10 which amended Proclamations
9704 and 9705. Proclamations 9710 and 9711 granted extensions until May 1, 2018 to
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, South Korea, and the European Union (EU),11 in addition to
the preexisting extensions for Canada and Mexico. These extensions were granted in light
of “important security relationships”12 and also make reference to shared policy interests
unique to these speciﬁc states.13 For all other countries, the tariffs went into effect on the
original date of March 23.14 China promptly responded by imposing tariffs on 128 U.S.
products worth approximately $3 billion in exports, describing the U.S. tariffs as “safeguard
measures . . . only targeted at a few countries [and that] violated the non-discrimination principle, which is the footstone of [the] multilateral trading system.”15
4

Id. at § 1862(c)(1)(A). For discussion of the Section 232 determination and of the tariffs as originally enacted,
see Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 315, 316–18 (2018).
5
Aluminum Tariff, supra note 1, at 11,621; Steel Tariff, supra note 2, at 11,627.
6
Aluminum Tariff, supra note 1, at 11,620; Steel Tariff, supra note 2, at 11,626.
7
Aluminum Tariff, supra note 1, at 11,620; Steel Tariff, supra note 2, at 11,626.
8
See, e.g., White House Press Release, Readout of President Donald J. Trump’s Call with President Mauricio
Macri of Argentina (Mar. 9, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/readout-presidentdonald-j-trumps-call-president-mauricio-macri-argentina [https://perma.cc/VWV5-YYRB] (“[T]he two leaders
discussed potential United States tariffs on foreign steel and aluminum.”); White House Press Release,
Readout of President Donald J. Trump’s Call with President Emmanuel Macron of France (Mar. 21, 2018),
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/readout-president-donald-j-trumps-call-president-emmanuelmacron-france-10 [https://perma.cc/HR24-DYMJ] (“The two leaders discussed how the United States and
Europe might come together over tariffs.”); Dep’t of Commerce Press Release, Joint Statement of U.S.
Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström (Mar. 21,
2018), at https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/03/joint-statement-us-secretary-commerce-wilburross-and-european [https://perma.cc/EV8C-CUTE] (“We have agreed to launch immediately a process of discussion with President Trump and the Trump Administration on trade issues of common concern, including steel
and aluminum, with a view to identifying mutually acceptable outcomes as rapidly as possible.”).
9
Proclamation No. 9710, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,355 (Mar. 22, 2018) [hereinafter March 22 Aluminum Extension].
10
Proclamation No. 9711, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,361 (Mar. 22, 2018) [hereinafter March 22 Steel Extension].
11
March 22 Aluminum Extension, supra note 9, at 13,355; March 22 Steel Extension, supra note 10, at
13,361.
12
March 22 Aluminum Extension, supra note 9, at 13,355; March 22 Steel Extension, supra note 10, at
13,361.
13
E.g., March 22 Aluminum Extension, supra note 9, at 13,356 (noting speciﬁcally for South Korea that the
important security relationship includes “our shared commitment to eliminating the North Korean nuclear threat;
our decades old military alliance; our shared commitment to addressing global excess capacity in aluminum production; and our strong economic and strategic partnership”).
14
March 22 Aluminum Extension, supra note 9, at 13,357; March 22 Steel Extension, supra note 10, at
13,363.
15
People’s Republic of China Ministry of Commerce Press Release, Spokesman of Ministry of Commerce
Comments on China’s Decision to Slap Tariffs on Part of Products Imported from US (Apr. 3, 2018), at
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Just before the end of March, South Korea and the United States “agreed on terms for a
country exemption for the Republic of Korea from tariffs imposed on steel imports . . . pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9705, as amended.”16 According to a press release from
South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy:
Regarding the steel tariff issue, Trade Minister Kim said that the U.S. agreed to exempt
Korea from steel tariffs imposed under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act and
that Korea agreed to receive a quota of about 2.68 million tons of steel exports annually.
This is equivalent to about 70 percent of the annual average Korean steel exports to the
U.S. between 2015 and 2017.17
The EU and the other countries that had received extensions continued to negotiate for
more permanent solutions. On April 30, 2018, again the day before the tariffs were to go
into effect, Trump signed Proclamation 973918 and Proclamation 9740,19 once again
amending Proclamations 9704 and 9705. Proclamations 9739 and 9740 split the remaining extension receivers, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and the EU, into two
distinct groups.
With regard to the ﬁrst group, comprised of Australia, Argentina, and Brazil, President
Trump found that, while the speciﬁc details of deals still had to be worked out, these countries had “agreed in principle . . . on satisfactory alternate means to address the threatened
impairment to our national security.”20 The text did not make clear what these “satisfactory alternate means” were, but a corresponding White House press release indicated that
the United States was focusing on quotas.21 News reports in the following month
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201804/20180402733539.shtml [https://
perma.cc/S7GK-QDGJ] (further claiming a “legitimate right to suspend part of its obligations to the US as a
WTO member”); see also People’s Republic of China Ministry of Commerce Press Release, The Spokesperson
of the Ministry of Commerce Makes Remarks on China’s Release of a List of Discontinuation Concessions
Against the U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports Under Section 232 (Mar. 24, 2018), at http://english.mofcom.
gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201803/20180302723376.shtml [https://perma.cc/EWE4-AYB7]
(giving notice of this intended action).
16
Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, Joint Statement by the United States Trade Representative Robert
E. Lighthizer and Republic of Korea Minister for Trade Hyun Chong Kim (Mar. 28, 2018), at https://ustr.gov/
about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2018/march/joint-statement-united-states-trade [https://
perma.cc/QF8J-AYZ6].
17
Republic of Korea Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy Press Release, Korea, US Reach Agreement on
Trade Deal and Steel Tariff Exemption (Mar. 26, 2018), at http://english.motie.go.kr/en/pc/photonews/bbs/
bbsList.do?bbs_cd_n=1&bbs_seq_n=678 [https://perma.cc/AUS2-L6L8]. This agreement was negotiated simultaneously with a successful renegotiation of the United States–Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS).
Id. While these resolutions have reduced trade tensions between the United States and South Korea, some issues
remain, as two requests for consultations brought in the WTO in May 2018 by South Korea demonstrate. See
WTO Press Release, Korea Initiates WTO Dispute Complaints against US Safeguard Duties on Washers, Solar
Cells (May 16, 2018), at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/ds545_546rfc_16may18_e.htm.
18
Proclamation No. 9739, 83 Fed. Reg. 20,677 (Apr. 30, 2018) [hereinafter April 30 Aluminum Extension].
19
Proclamation No. 9740, 83 Fed. Reg. 20,683 (Apr. 30, 2018) [hereinafter April 30 Steel Extension].
20
April 30 Aluminum Extension, supra note 18, at 20,677; April 30 Steel Extension, supra note 19, at 20,684.
Proclamation 9740 additionally implemented the tariff waiver struck with South Korea, exempting South Korea
from the steel tariff but noting that “[t]he United States will monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the
[steel] quota and other measures agreed upon with South Korea in addressing our national security needs, and
[Trump] may revisit this [exemption], as appropriate.” April 30 Steel Extension, supra note 19, at 20,684.
21
White House Press Release, President Donald J. Trump Approves Section 232 Tariff Modiﬁcations (Apr. 30,
2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/president-donald-j-trump-approves-section-232-
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supported this as to Argentina and, with respect to steel, as to Brazil.22 (Australian ofﬁcials,
by contrast, rejected reports that Australia had agreed to quotas, stating that they received a
“permanent and unconditional” exemption.23) These three countries thus received tariff
exemptions without expiration dates, although the proclamations include a provision that
“if the satisfactory alternative means are not ﬁnalized shortly, [Trump] will consider reimposing the tariff.”24 On May 31, President Trump issued two more proclamations relevant to these countries, with Proclamation 9759 granting permanent exemptions to all
three countries with respect to steel25 and Proclamation 9758 granting permanent exemptions to Argentina and Australia with respect to aluminum.26 These exemptions were
given because the “United States has agreed on a range of measures with these countries,
including measures to reduce excess [steel/aluminum] production and excess [steel/
aluminum] capacity . . . .”27
The remaining countries, Canada, Mexico, and the EU, had not come to any agreement
with the United States at the time of the April 30 proclamations. But in light of an asserted
need for continuing and productive discussions, Trump elected to reextend the non-enforcement period for all three until June 1, 2018. By the time this date arrived, no deals had been
reached with any of the three, and the tariffs accordingly went into effect.28 For Canada and
Mexico, the negotiations were wrapped up in the ongoing negotiations over the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).29 For its part, the EU was ﬁrm in its insistence
that it “will not negotiate under threat” and that it should be “fully and permanently
tariff-modiﬁcations [https://perma.cc/HW65-B7RP] (“In all of these negotiations, the Administration is
focused on quotas that will restrain imports, prevent transshipment, and protect the national security.”).
22
Government Celebrates Exemption from US Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, BUENOS AIRES TIMES (May 5, 2018), at
http://www.batimes.com.ar/news/economy/government-celebrates-exemption-from-us-steel-and-aluminiumtariffs.phtml (noting Argentina’s acceptance of a 180,000 ton quota for both steel and aluminum); Bruno
Federowski & Alberto Alerigi, U.S. Cuts off Brazil Tariff Talks, Adopts Steep Import Quotas, REUTERS (May 2,
2018), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-brazil/us-cuts-off-brazil-tariff-talks-adopts-steel-importquotas-idUSKBN1I31ZD (stating that Brazil had arranged for a 3.5 million ton quota for steel but had accepted
the 10% tariff on aluminum).
23
Paul Karp, Australia Rejects Fears Trump Steel Tariff Exemption Subject to Quotas, GUARDIAN (May 1, 2018), at
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/may/02/australia-rejects-fears-trump-steel-tariff-exemptionsubject-to-quotas.
24
April 30 Aluminum Extension, supra note 18, at 20,678; April 30 Steel Extension, supra note 19, at 20,684.
25
Proclamation No. 9759, 83 Fed. Reg. 25,857 (May 31, 2018) [hereinafter May 31 Steel Proclamation].
26
Proclamation No. 9758, 83 Fed. Reg. 25,849 (May 31, 2018) [hereinafter May 31 Aluminum
Proclamation].
27
May 31 Steel Proclamation, supra note 25, at 25,857; May 31 Aluminum Proclamation, supra note 26, at
25,849. While the proclamations speciﬁed new quotas for Argentina and, with respect to steel, for Brazil, they did
not identify any quotas for Australia. See May 31 Steel Proclamation, supra note 25, at 25,858–59; May 31
Aluminum Proclamation, supra note 26, at 25,851.
28
See May 31 Steel Proclamation, supra note 25, at 25,858; May 31 Aluminum Proclamation, supra note 26, at
25,850 (both “maintain[ing] the current tariff level as it applies to other countries”); see also David J. Lynch, Josh
Dawsey & Damian Paletta, Trump Imposes Steel and Aluminum Tariffs on the E.U., Canada, and Mexico, WASH.
POST (May 31, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-imposes-steel-and-aluminumtariffs-on-the-european-union-canada-and-mexico/2018/05/31/891bb452-64d3-11e8-a69c-b944de66d9e7_story.
html?utm_term=.9001549fb075 (reporting on this issue).
29
See David Lawder, Canada Sees Progress on NAFTA Auto Rules; Steel Tariffs Loom, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2018), at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta/canada-sees-progress-on-nafta-auto-rules-steel-tariffs-loomidUSKBN1HW2R8 (reporting that Mexico’s negotiators are “unhappy about having to deal with the steel tariff
threat in parallel with the NAFTA negotiations,” and that Canada remains opposed to the tariffs, feeling that they
should have a “full and permanent exemption from any quotas or tariffs” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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exempted from these measures.”30 As of June 1, the EU, Mexico, and Canada had all signaled
their intent to retaliate: “[t]he EU said it would impose import taxes on politically sensitive
items like bourbon from Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s home state . . . . Mexico
said it would levy tariffs on American farm products, while Canada zeroed in on the same
metals that Trump had targeted.”31
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. tariffs have generated responses within the WTO framework.
Already at odds with the United States over other trade issues,32 China was the ﬁrst to act.
On April 5, 2018, China ﬁled a request for consultations in the WTO concerning the steel
and aluminum tariffs.33 The request alleged multiple violations of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and its associated Agreement on Safeguards.34 As to
GATT 1994, China claimed that the United States had imposed excess duties and was
imposing its tariffs selectively.35 As to the Agreement on Safeguards, China asserted that
the U.S. tariffs were “safeguard measures in substance.”36 It considered that the United
States neither had an adequate justiﬁcation for seeking to protect its domestic steel and
aluminum industries through safeguards nor had followed the appropriate procedures
for implementing safeguard measures.37
The United States responded that its tariffs were not safeguards, but rather tariffs that it
was entitled to impose in light of GATT Article XXI, a provision which allows members to
act for the protection of “essential security interests.”38 Accordingly, the United States
claimed, its tariffs “are issues of national security not susceptible to review or capable of
resolution by WTO dispute settlement,” although it agreed to enter into consultations
“[w]ithout prejudice” to this position.39 It added that “[b]ecause the tariffs imposed pursuant to Section 232 are not safeguard measures, the United States considers Article 8.2 of
the Agreement on Safeguards does not justify China’s suspension of concessions or other
obligations”—and thus, in the United States’ view, China had no right to respond by targeting U.S. exports.40

30
European Commission Press Release, Commission Statement Following US Announcement of an Extension
Until 1 June of the EU’s Exemption from US Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Imports (May 1, 2018), at http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1839&title=Commission-statement-following-US-announcement-of-an-extension-until-1-June-of-the-EUs-exemption-from-US-tariffs-on-steel-and-aluminium-imports
[https://perma.cc/JPB7-H76M].
31
Lynch, Dawsey & Paletta, supra note 28.
32
See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 505 (2018).
33
Request for Consultations by China, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products,
WTO Doc. G/L1222; G/SG/D50/1; WT/DS544/1 (Apr. 5, 2018) hereinafter China Section 232 Request for
Consultations.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 2 (citing Article II:1(a) & (b) and Article I:1, respectively, and also raising a claim under Article X:3 “because
the United States has failed to administer its laws . . . in a uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner”).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Communication from the United States, United States–Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS544/2 (Apr. 13, 2018).
39
Id.
40
Id. Article 8.2 allows states to respond to safeguard measures by “the application of substantially equivalent
concessions or other measures” if “no agreement is reached within 30 days in the consultations” and subject to a
notice requirement. Agreement on Safeguards, Art. 1, April 15, 1994, 1869 UNTS 154, 157.
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The EU, along with India, Russia, Thailand, and Hong Kong, have sought to join the
China-initiated consultations.41 India and the EU have also each submitted their own
requests for consultations, as have several other countries including Mexico and Canada.42
In addition to proceedings at the international level, at least one case challenging the steel
tariffs has been brought in the U.S. Court of International Trade.43 The action, brought by a
Swiss steel exporter and its U.S. afﬁliate, alleges that
[t]he imposition of that tariff on the Plaintiff’s steel is unconstitutional inasmuch
as the Administration’s Steel Proclamation was issued purely for political and
economic reasons, and therefore exceeded the scope of Congress’s delegation of
authority to the Executive Branch to impose tariffs to promote and protect national
security.44
The complaint also alleged a failure to provide fair notice.45
Notwithstanding the political and legal responses to the steel and aluminum tariffs, in the
future the Trump administration may pursue Section 232 tariffs on other products as well.
On May 23, 2018, “following a conversation with President Donald J. Trump, U.S. Secretary
of Commerce Wilbur Ross initiated an investigation under Section 232 . . . [regarding]
whether imports of automobiles . . . and automotive parts into the United States threaten
to impair . . . national security . . . .”46

41
Request to Join Consultations—Communication from India, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS544/3 (Apr. 17, 2018); Request to Join Consultations—
Communication from Thailand, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS544/5 (Apr. 18, 2018); Request to Join Consultations—Communication from the Russian Federation,
United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS544/4 (Apr. 18, 2018);
Request to Join Consultations—Communication from the European Union, United States—Certain Measures
on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS544/7 (Apr. 19, 2018); Request to Join Consultations—
Communication from Hong Kong, China, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS544/6 (Apr. 19, 2018).
42
Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS551/1 (June 5, 2018); Request for Consultations by Canada, United States—Certain
Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS550/1 (June 1, 2018); Request for
Consultations by the European Union, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS548/1 (June 1, 2018); Request for Consultations by India, United States—Certain
Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS547/1 (May 18, 2018). Various countries have
requested to join these consultations.
43
Complaint, Severstal Export GMBH v. United States of America (No. 18-00057) (U.S. Ct. Int’l Trade Mar.
22, 2018).
44
Id. at 1.
45
Id.; see also Todd N. Tucker, First Case Filed Against Administration’s National Security Motivated Tariffs,
LAWFARE (Apr. 6, 2018), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/ﬁrst-case-ﬁled-against-administrations-national-security-motivated-tariffs (discussing the case and subsequent developments).
46
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce Press Release, U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation
into Auto Imports (May 23, 2018), at https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/05/us-departmentcommerce-initiates-section-232-investigation-auto-imports [https://perma.cc/A8XL-M79N]; see also White
House Press Release, Statement from the President on Potential National Security Investigation into
Automobile Imports (May 23, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-president-potential-national-security-investigation-automobile-imports [https://perma.cc/JL6S-RRHU].

2018

CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES

505

United States Moves Forward with Tariffs and Requests WTO Consultations in Response to
Certain Trade Practices by China
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.68

Trade tensions between the United States and China have escalated under the Trump
administration. Some of this tension has resulted from the steel and aluminum tariffs imposed
by the United States on most of its trading partners in the spring of 2018.1 Another major
source of conﬂict relates to President Trump’s concerns with China’s perceived unfair practices in relation to intellectual property and technology rights. The Trump administration has
addressed these concerns both by pursuing unilateral responses and seeking relief through the
World Trade Organization (WTO).
On August 14, 2017, Trump directed the U.S. Ofﬁce of the Trade Representative (USTR)
to “determine, consistent with . . . the Trade Act of 1974 . . . , whether to investigate any of
China’s laws, policies, practices, or actions that may be unreasonable or discriminatory and
that may be harming American intellectual property rights, innovation, or technology development.”2 On August 18, 2017, USTR responded to this directive by initiating an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act,3 which it describes as “a key enforcement tool that
may be used to address a wide variety of unfair acts, policies, and practices of U.S. trading
partners.”4
In the ﬁnal report for this investigation on March 22, 2018, USTR concluded that China
was engaging in a number of unfair trade practices related to intellectual property and technology.5 As summarized in an accompanying press release, the report reached four distinct
conclusions related to Chinese trade practices:
(1) China uses foreign ownership restrictions, including joint venture requirements,
equity limitations, and other investment restrictions, to require or pressure technology transfer from U.S. companies to Chinese entities. China also uses administrative
review and licensing procedures to require or pressure technology transfer, which,
inter alia, undermines the value of U.S. investments and technology and weakens
the global competitiveness of U.S. ﬁrms.
(2) China imposes substantial restrictions on, and intervenes in, U.S. ﬁrms’ investments
and activities, including through restrictions on technology licensing terms. These
restrictions deprive U.S. technology owners of the ability to bargain and set market-

1

These developments are discussed in Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL
499 (2018).
2
Presidential Memorandum of Aug. 14, 2017, Addressing China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, and Actions
Related to Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Technology, 82 Fed. Reg. 39007, 39007 (Aug. 17, 2017).
3
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of
China (Aug. 18, 2017), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2017/august/ustrannounces-initiation-section [https://perma.cc/KDE5-NVFB].
4
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES
RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER Section 301 OF THE TRADE
ACT OF 1974, at 3 (2018) [hereinafter USTR Section 301 Report]; see also infra note 20 and accompanying text
(describing Section 301 in more detail).
5
See generally id.
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based terms for technology transfer. As a result, U.S. companies seeking to license
technologies must do so on terms that unfairly favor Chinese recipients.
(3) China directs and facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S.
companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and
intellectual property and to generate large-scale technology transfer in industries
deemed important by Chinese government industrial plans.
(4) China conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft from, the
computer networks of U.S. companies. These actions provide the Chinese government with unauthorized access to intellectual property, trade secrets, or conﬁdential
business information, including technical data, negotiating positions, and sensitive
and proprietary internal business communications, and they also support China’s
strategic development goals, including its science and technology advancement, military modernization, and economic development.6
That same day, Trump issued a memorandum noting these ﬁndings and directing USTR to
take two actions in response: ﬁrst, pursuing tariff increases; and second, seeking WTO dispute settlement “to address China’s discriminatory licensing practices.”7
Regarding tariffs, Trump speciﬁcally directed USTR to “publish a proposed list of
products and any intended tariff increases within 15 days. . . .” 8 When released on
April 3 by USTR, the list contained roughly 1,300 separate tariff lines aimed at $50 billion of Chinese imports, subject to a notice and comment period with the ﬁnal list to be
determined thereafter.9
Over the following several months, China and the United States engaged in a series of
negotiations and further actions relating to these proposed tariffs. China at one point threatened retaliatory tariffs on $50 billion of U.S. goods,10 leading the United States to threaten
tariffs on an additional $100 billion of Chinese goods.11 At other times China signaled a willingness to make concessions to the United States, including making a reduction in tariffs on

6
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China’s
Unfair Trade (Mar. 22, 2018), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2018/march/
president-trump-announces-strong [https://perma.cc/XS8U-A3H5].
7
Presidential Memorandum of March 22, 2018, on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301
Investigation of China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 13099, 13100 (Mar. 27, 2018). In addition, the memorandum instructed
the secretary of the Treasury to “propose executive branch action . . . to address concerns about investment in the
United States directed or facilitated by China in industries or technologies deemed important to the United
States.” Id.
8
Id.
9
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, Under Section 301 Action, USTR Releases Proposed Tariff List
on Chinese Products (Apr. 3, 2018), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2018/
april/under-section-301-action-ustr [https://perma.cc/7T78-QWBY].
10
See China Announces Additional Tariffs on $50 Billion of U.S. Goods, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2018), at https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-tariffs-statement/china-announces-additional-tariffs-on-50-billion-of-u-sgoods-idUSKCN1HB0W6. By this time, China had already announced retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods in
response to the new U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum. See Galbraith, supra note 1, at 500.
11
White House Press Release, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump’s Actions
Responding to China’s Unfair Trade Practices (Apr. 6, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/need-know-president-donald-j-trumps-actions-responding-chinas-unfair-trade-practices [https://perma.
cc/678G-JHB3].
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imported cars and their parts12 and offering to purchase more American goods.13 For its part,
the United States at one point suggested that it would not move forward with its proposed
tariffs pending negotiations,14 but, as of the end of May, it had decided otherwise. On May
29, the White House released a statement announcing that, in accordance with the Section
301 report:
the United States will impose a 25 percent tariff on $50 billion of goods imported
from China containing industrially signiﬁcant technology, including those related
to the “Made in China 2025” program. The ﬁnal list of covered imports will be
announced by June 15, 2018, and tariffs will be imposed on those imports shortly
thereafter.15
On June 15, the Trump administration ﬁnalized its list of imports subject to the tariffs, with
implementation to begin on July 6, leading China to announce that it would impose comparable tariffs in response.16
As a matter of U.S. domestic law, the authority of the Trump administration to impose
these tariffs pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 may depend on the extent
to which China’s perceived unfair practices lie outside the reach of existing WTO agreements.
In 1994, when seeking congressional approval for the Uruguay Round, the Clinton administration submitted a statement of administrative action, which, among other things, speciﬁed
how the executive branch’s use of Section 301 would relate to the newly revitalized international trade regime:
[F]or [Section 301] investigations that involve an alleged violation of a Uruguay Round
agreement or the impairment of U.S. beneﬁts under such an agreement . . . the Trade
Representative will
12
Keith Bradsher, China Cuts Car Tariffs, in a Small Offering to the U.S. on Trade, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018),
at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/business/china-cuts-auto-tariffs.html.
13
See, e.g., Ana Swanson & Alan Rappeport, U.S. Suspends Tariffs on China, Stoking Fears of a Loss of Leverage,
N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/20/us/politics/mnuchin-kudlow-china-trade.
html.
14
Id. For discussion of earlier U.S. negotiating demands and their relationship to international trade law, see
Julia Qin, Could the US-China Trade Conﬂict Be Dealt with within the WTO Framework?, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y
BLOG (May 5, 2018), at http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/05/could-the-us-china-trade-conﬂictbe-dealt-with-within-the-wto-framework.html.
15
White House Press Release, Statement on Steps to Protect Domestic Technology and Intellectual Property
from China’s Discriminatory and Burdensome Trade Practices (May 29, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
brieﬁngs-statements/statement-steps-protect-domestic-technology-intellectual-property-chinas-discriminatoryburdensome-trade-practices [https://perma.cc/RG79-ZBEX] (also announcing a plan to implement, for national
security reasons, “speciﬁc investment restrictions and enhanced export controls for Chinese persons and entities
related to the acquisition of industrially signiﬁcant technology”). Made in China 2025 is a state-sponsored program aimed at bolstering China’s advanced manufacturing capabilities. See Kristen Hopewell, What Is ‘Made in
China 2025’—and Why Is It a Threat to Trump’s Trade Goals?, WASH. POST (May 3, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/03/what-is-made-in-china-2025-and-why-is-it-a-threat-totrumps-trade-goals/?utm_term=.0f8bf76f8b14 (reporting on the program’s goals and methods of attainment,
potential impact on the U.S. market, and the efﬁcacy of the U.S. response).
16
David J. Lynch & Emily Rauhala, With Tariffs, Trump Starts Unraveling a Quarter-Century of U.S.-China
Economic Ties, WASH. POST (June 15, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trumpimposes-import-taxes-on-chinese-goods-and-warns-of-additional-tariffs/2018/06/15/da909ecc-7092-11e8bf86-a2351b5ece99_story.html?utm_term=.b2bf1057ca82.
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• invoke [Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)] dispute settlement procedures,
as required under current law;
• base any section 301 determination that there has been a violation or denial of U.S.
rights under the relevant agreement on the panel or Appellate Body ﬁndings
adopted by the [Dispute Settlement Body (DBS)].
• following adoption of a favorable panel or Appellate Body report, allow the defending party a reasonable period of time to implement the report’s recommendations;
and
• if the matter cannot be resolved during that period, seek authority from the DSB to
retaliate.
Neither section 301 nor the DSU will require the Trade Representative to invoke DSU
dispute settlement procedures if the Trade Representative does not consider that a matter
involves a Uruguay Round agreement. Section 301 will remain fully available to address
unfair practices that do not violate U.S. rights or deny U.S. beneﬁts under the Uruguay
Round agreements and, as in the past, such investigations will not involve recourse to
multilateral dispute settlement procedures.17
In addition to making clear that it would wait to impose retaliatory measures pursuant to
Section 301 for issues involving U.S. rights under WTO agreements, the Clinton administration
also acknowledged “the expectation of the Congress that future Administrations” would abide by
the statement of administrative action.18 And in its law approving the Uruguay Round, Congress
explicitly “approve[d] . . . the statement of administrative action.”19
Perhaps in an attempt to sidestep the legal concerns that would arise from an explicit
attempt to disregard the 1994 statement of administrative action, USTR has described its
Section 301 investigation as focused not on violations of international trade law per se, but
rather more generally on “acts, policies or practices that are unreasonable or discriminatory
and that burden or restrict U.S. Commerce.”20 Nonetheless, there are now ongoing proceedings relating to the Section 301 investigation in the WTO, where both the United States and
China have requested consultations.

17
H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 1034–35 (1994); see also United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of
1974, Panel Report of Dec. 22, 1999, WT/DS152/R, at VII.1545 (concluding that this is a “lawful and effective”
curtailment of USTR’s authority).
18
H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, supra note 17, at 656 (applying this language generally to the statement of administrative action).
19
Pub. L. 103-465, at § 101(a)(2), 108 Stat. 4809, 4814 (1994); see also id., § 102(d), 108 Stat. at 4819
(describing this statement of administrative action as “an authoritative expression” of interpretation).
20
USTR Section 301 Report, supra note 4, at 3 (describing this language as coming from the “most relevant”
statutory source of authority). This language tracks Section 301(b), which does not reference international trade
law and provides USTR with discretionary authority to respond to unfair trade practices, as compared to Section
301(a), which requires USTR to respond to violations of international trade law. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) & (b).
In describing Section 301, USTR did not mention the statement of administrative action. See USTR Section 301
Report, supra note 4, at 3–4. For a more thorough discussion of the legal framework surrounding Section 301 investigations and the relevant implications for this current dispute, see CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS, TRICKS OF THE TRADE:
SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION OF CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRACTICES CONCLUDES (PART I), CONG. RES. SERV.
(Mar. 29, 2018); CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS, TRICKS OF THE TRADE: Section 301 INVESTIGATION OF CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRACTICES CONCLUDES (PART II), CONG. RES. SERV. (Mar. 29, 2018).
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The United States ﬁled its request for consultations at the WTO on March 23, 2018 as
part of President Trump’s response to the Section 301 investigation.21 Focusing on one
aspect of the ﬁndings of the Section 301 investigation, it argued that, “China deprives foreign
intellectual property rights holders of the ability to protect their intellectual property rights in
China as well as freely negotiate market-based terms in licensing and other technology-related
contracts.”22
China ﬁled its own request for consultations on April 3, 2018, responding to the initial
proposed list of tariffs announced by the United States.23 It asserted that these proposed tariffs
would violate Article I.1 and II.1(a) and (b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 1994, and also that they would violate Article 23 of the DSU, “because the measures
at issue fail to recourse to [sic], and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU.”24 The
Trump administration responded by saying that it was willing to engage in consultations,
even though no tariffs had been imposed to date and the issue was therefore premature.25
An additional strain on trade relations between China and the United States that exists
outside of the conﬁnes of the Section 301 investigation is the fate of Zhongxing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) Corporation, a company recognized as “China’s second-largest maker of telecommunications equipment.”26 In mid-April the Trump administration announced that, effective immediately, it was banning ZTE from making use of
technology exports from the United States.27 This ban resulted from ZTE’s failure to punish
employees who the United States had found to be in violation of American sanctions against
Iran and North Korea,28 a failure which in turn violated an earlier settlement reached between
the United States and ZTE.29 Less than a month after the order was imposed ZTE appeared
to be on the verge of collapse, announcing that it had ceased “major operating activities.”30
21

Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, Following President Trump’s Section 301 Decisions, USTR
Launches New WTO Challenge Against China (Mar. 23, 2018), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/
press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2018/march/following-president-trump%E2%80%99s-section [https://perma.cc/
58AC-32WZ].
22
Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights, at 1, WTO Doc. IP/D/38; WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 23, 2018) (citing Article 64 of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)). Japan and the EU are
two of several parties who have requested to join the consultations.
23
Request for Consultations by China, United States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods From China, at 2,
WTO Doc. G/L/1219;WT/DS543/1 (Apr. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by China]; cf. US
“Section 301” Action Against China’s Intellectual Property Regime Questioned at WTO Goods Council, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (Mar. 26, 2018), at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/good_28mar18_e.htm (summarizing concerns raised by China with regard to the tariffs at a meeting of the Goods Council).
24
Request for Consultations by China, supra note 23.
25
Communication from the United States, United States–Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China, WTO
Doc. WT/DS543/2 (Apr. 13, 2018). For China’s further response, see Communication from China, United
States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS543/3 (Apr. 27, 2018).
26
Maul Mozur & Ana Swanson, Chinese Tech Company Blocked from Buying American Components, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/16/technology/chinese-tech-company-blocked-frombuying-american-components.html.
27
Order Activating Suspended Denial Order Relating to Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment
Corporation and Zte Kangxu, 83 Fed. Reg. 17644, 17647 (Apr. 23, 2018).
28
Id. at 17646.
29
Id. at 17645.
30
Raymon Zhong, Chinese Tech Giant on Brink of Collapse in New U.S. Cold War, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018),
at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/technology/zte-china-us-trade-war.html.
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The fate of ZTE has now become intertwined with the broader China-U.S. trade negotiations. On May 13, Trump indicated that he and President Xi Jinping were working together
to try and stop the collapse of ZTE.31

Developments Relating to U.S. Trade Negotiations—KORUS, NAFTA, and Trade Promotion
Authority
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.65

Consistent with his approach on the campaign trail, President Trump has demonstrated a continued interest in revamping U.S. trade agreements. By the late spring of 2018, the Trump administration had negotiated modest changes to the United States-Republic of Korea Free Trade
Agreement (KORUS) in favor of U.S. interests. It had yet to reach any ﬁnal agreement with regard
to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), despite the expiration of an initial deadline that was designed to ensure adequate time for a vote on the negotiated agreement by the present
Congress. To ease the passage of future trade deals, Trump has triggered the three-year extension of
a process that provides expedited congressional consideration of negotiated trade agreements.
On March 28, 2018, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer released a joint statement with South Korea’s Minister for Trade announcing that “the United States and the
Republic of Korea have reached an agreement in principle on the general terms of amendments and modiﬁcations to the United States–Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement.”1
This agreement is the culmination of a review initiated in 2017, which involved two special
sessions of the Joint Committee established under KORUS’s Article 22.2.2 Under this provision, in addition to various supervisory obligations, the Joint Committee may “consider
amendments to this Agreement or make modiﬁcations to the commitments therein.”3

31
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 13, 2018, 11:01 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/995680316458262533; see also Ana Swanson, Trump Administration Plans to Revive
ZTE, Prompting Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/us/politics/
trump-trade-zte.html (reporting that the Commerce Department had reached a deal with ZTE that would lift
the ban in exchange for the payment of a ﬁne and internal restructuring). As of late June, members of
Congress had begun efforts to block such a deal through legislative action. See Sarah Ferris & John Bresnahan,
Senate GOP Fires Another Warning Shot at Trump over Chinese Telecom Giant, POLITICO (June 25, 2018), at https://
www.politico.com/story/2018/06/25/trump-zte-senate-chinese-telecom-671845 (describing some of these
efforts, including a provision passed by the Senate as part of a broader appropriations bill).
1
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, Joint Statement by the United States Trade Representative Robert
E. Lighthizer and Republic of Korea Minister for Trade Hyun Chong Kim (Mar. 28, 2018), at https://ustr.gov/
about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2018/march/joint-statement-united-states-trade [https://
perma.cc/T4PK-6677] [hereinafter KORUS Joint Statement].
2
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, USTR Calls a Special Session Under the U.S.-Korea Free Trade
Agreement (July 12, 2017), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2017/july/ustrcalls-special-session-under-us [https://perma.cc/5GTC-E4HH]; Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release,
USTR Announces Second Special Session of the U.S.-Korea FTA Joint Committee (Sept. 22, 2017), at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2017/september/ustr-announces-second-special
[https://perma.cc/4AWB-XV44].
3
United States–Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement, Art. 22.2, para. 3(c), June 30, 2007.
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At the time of the announcement, negotiators were still ﬁnalizing the terms of the agreement, which remain “subject to domestic procedures in both nations before provisions can be
brought into force.”4 The announcement nonetheless identiﬁed what appear to be the main
revisions. According to the South Korean Ministry of Trade:
Under the updated agreement, Korea will allow the U.S. to extend its 25 percent tariff on
imports of Korean pickup trucks by additional 20 years to 2041. The tariff was originally
scheduled to expire in 2021. Korea will also allow U.S. automakers selling fewer than
50,000 units per year in Korea to be exempt from Korean safety standards as long as
they meet U.S. safety standards, up from 25,000 vehicles previously.5
A press release from the White House noted these same terms, while emphasizing that “South
Korea is simplifying the sales environment for U.S. cars and parts by taking into account U.S.
environmental and emissions standards.”6 South Korea agreed to “expand the number of
‘eco-credits’ available for U.S. automakers to meet South Korean emissions standards” and
to take “U.S. corporate average fuel economy regulations into account” when setting fuel
economy standards.7 The agreement on a renegotiated KORUS occurred at the same time
that the two countries reached an understanding whereby South Korea obtained an exemption from recently imposed U.S. tariffs on steel imports in exchange for reducing the amount
of steel it exports to the United States.8
When the negotiations were initiated in 2017, several members of Congress, including the
chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee,
signaled some unease regarding the authority of the Joint Committee in a letter to Lighthizer:
[W]hile KORUS established a Joint Committee under Article 22.2 to supervise implementation, consider ways to further enhance trade relations between the Parties, and consider amendments to the Agreement, the United States cedes no sovereignty to the Joint
Committee. Indeed, any changes affecting the United States resulting from the work of
that Joint Committee cannot take effect unless either the President exercises his authorities as delegated to him by Congress or Congress makes changes to U.S. statutes.9
As negotiated, the amendments do not appear to contain new concessions by the United
States to South Korea. This will likely enable the executive branch to move forward with
4
5

KORUS Joint Statement, supra note 1.

Republic of Korea Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy Press Release, Korea, US Reach Agreement on
Trade Deal and Steel Tariff Exemption (Mar. 26, 2018), at http://english.motie.go.kr/en/pc/photonews/bbs/
bbsList.do?bbs_cd_n=1&bbs_seq_n=678 [https://perma.cc/AUS2-L6L8].
6
White House Press Release, President Donald J. Trump is Fulﬁlling His Promise on The U.S.–Korea Free
Trade Agreement and on National Security (Mar. 28, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/president-donald-j-trump-fulﬁlling-promise-u-s-korea-free-trade-agreement-national-security [https://
perma.cc/Y339-ARNB].
7
Id. (also noting a few other aspects of the deal).
8
See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 501 (2018).
9
Letter from Kevin Brady, Chairman House Ways and Means Committee, Orrin Hatch, Chairman Senate
Finance Committee, Richard E. Neal, Ranking Member House Ways and Means Committee, and Ron
Wyden, Ranking Member Senate Finance Committee, to Robert E. Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Representative
(July 17, 2017), available at https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2017-07-17KORUS-Big-4-Letter-to-Lighthizer.pdf. The letter noted that the Trump administration had not taken the
steps needed to ensure that any amendments would receive expedited consideration from Congress. Id.
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ratifying the amendments without seeking congressional approval.10 In terms of implementation, however, a congressional law may be needed for the United States to take
advantage of the negotiated right to extend tariffs on imported Korean trucks for an additional twenty years.
By the end of May 2018, no announcement had been made of the agreement’s ﬁnalization
and its text had not been released. In late March, Trump suggested that “I may hold it up until
after a deal is made with North Korea.”11 He continued, “Does everybody understand that?
You know why, right? You know why? Because it’s a very strong card.”12 On April 24, however, Trump referenced the deal by stating, “[i]n South Korea, on our trade deal, we’re doing
very well.”13
The renegotiation of NAFTA has proceeded less smoothly. Seven rounds of negotiations
had taken place by the middle of May 2018, but no agreement had been reached.14 The negotiations thus continued past the initial May 17 deadline set by Speaker Paul Ryan for when
the Trump administration needed to provide the negotiated deal to Congress to ensure review
prior to the end of the session.15 (Ryan later relaxed this deadline, stating that there might be
“‘wiggle room.”16)
A variety of issues appear to be blocking progress, including disagreements between the
United States and Mexico regarding regulations for the auto industry and resistance to
U.S. demands that the agreement include a sunset clause that would allow NAFTA to expire
every ﬁve years if not renegotiated.17 Disagreements have also risen over the Trump administration’s desire to secure changes in Mexico’s immigration policy as a part of the agreement,
including an outcome that would allow the United States to turn asylum seekers from other
Central American countries back at the border.18 Tensions have been exacerbated by other
10
See Jeffrey J. Schott, Fixing the KORUS FTA–Without Fireworks, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. (Jan. 26, 2018),
at https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/ﬁxing-korus-fta-without-ﬁreworks (noting that “Korean
ofﬁcials have been pragmatic in response to US demands for additional Korean concessions without complementary US reforms” as they “recogniz[e] that US ofﬁcials can only address requests for KORUS FTA revisions that do
not require congressional approval”); Ellyn Ferguson, White House Says Revised South Korea Trade Pact Within
Reach, ROLL CALL (Mar. 28, 2018), at https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/white-house-says-revised-southkorea-trade-pact-within-reach (reporting that “Congress does not have to approve the ﬁnal agreement”).
11
Katie Rogers & Jim Tankersley, Trump Heralds South Korea Trade Deal, Then Says He Might Delay It, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/us/politics/trump-infrastructure-trade-dealsouth-korea.html.
12
Id.
13
Donald J. Trump, Remarks Prior to an Expanded Bilateral Meeting with President Emmanuel Macron of
France, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Apr. 24, 2018).
14
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, USTR Robert Lighthizer Issues Statement on Status of NAFTA
Renegotiation (May 14, 2018), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2018/may/
ustr-robert-lighthizer-issues-statement [https://perma.cc/4LLV-PH7J].
15
Adam Behsudi, Ryan Says May 17 Is Deadline to Assure 2018 NAFTA Vote, POLITICO (May 10, 2018), at
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/10/paul-ryan-nafta-vote-deadline-1200989.
16
Vicki Needham, Lighthizer says NAFTA Countries Are “Nowhere” Near Reaching a Deal, THE HILL (May 17,
2018), at http://thehill.com/policy/ﬁnance/388263-lighthizer-says-nafta-countries-are-nowhere-near-reaching-adeal.
17
Maham Abedi, 4 Challenges NAFTA Negotiations Are Facing as Deadline Looms, GLOBAL NEWS (May 15,
2018), at https://globalnews.ca/news/4209888/nafta-negotiations-disagreements.
18
Ana Swanson & Elisabeth Malkin, Chance of NAFTA Deal in 2018 Diminishes as Talks Drag Past
Congressional Deadline, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/us/politics/naftadeal-deadline-congress.html.
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threats and actions by the Trump administration, including assertions that the United States
might exit the agreement entirely19 and the imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs, which
the president has linked to the failure to renegotiate NAFTA.20 On May 17, Lighthizer
described the negotiators as “nowhere near close to a deal.”21
In terms of domestic legal process, the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015 allows for an expedited process for congressional approval for
trade agreements,22 a process known as Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Assuming that
a speciﬁc set of circumstances are met, TPA ensures that the agreement receives ﬂoor consideration in a timely manner, imposes limits on debate, and prohibits amendments.23 Passage
of the agreement requires only an up-or-down vote.24 TPA is designed to expire by July 1,
2018,25 unless an extension is requested by the president and “neither House of Congress
adopts an extension disapproval resolution . . . before July 1, 2018.”26 In that case, TPA is
extended until July 1, 2021.27
On March 20, 2018, Trump requested the extension of TPA.28 In his letter to Congress,
he noted the ongoing NAFTA renegotiations and more generally his administration’s pursuit
of “new and better trade deals for America’s workers, farmers, ranchers, and businesses.”29 He
described TPA’s extension as “essential to fulﬁll that task and to demonstrate to our trading
partners that my Administration and the Congress share a common goal when it comes to
trade.”30 As of the end of May, neither the House nor the Senate had adopted a resolution of
disapproval of the extension.

19
E.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 1, 2018, 10:25 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/980451155548491777 (“Mexico is doing very little if not NOTHING, at stopping
people from ﬂowing into Mexico through their Southern Border, and then into the U.S. They laugh at our
dumb immigration laws. They must stop the big drug and people ﬂows, or I will stop their cash cow, NAFTA.
NEED WALL!”).
20
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 5, 2018, 6:47 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/970626966004162560; see also Galbraith, supra note 8, at 502.
21
Needham, supra note 16.
22
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-26, 129
Stat. 320 (codiﬁed at 19 U.S.C §§ 4201–4210).
23
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & IAN F. FERGUSSON, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, CONG. RES. SERV. 21 (Apr. 10, 2018).
24
Id. at 1.
25
19 U.S.C. § 4202(a)(1)(A)(i).
26
Id. § 4202(c)(1)(B). This use of a one-house veto may be constitutionally questionable under INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983), which invalidated a one-house veto provision on the ground that it was inconsistent with the
Constitution’s Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses. Nonetheless, as a practical matter, Congress may be in a
position to take account of any use of a one-house veto in deciding whether to engage in the expedited approval
process.
27
19 U.S.C. § 4202(c)(1)(B).
28
H.R. DOC. NO. 115-104, at 1 (2018).
29
Id.
30
Id.
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USE OF FORCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION
President Trump Withdraws the United States from the Iran Deal and Announces the
Reimposition of Sanctions
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.67
As a candidate, Donald Trump made clear that, if elected, he would “dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”1 Nonetheless, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
remained in place throughout 2017, and all four International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) reports that year veriﬁed Iran’s compliance with its nuclear commitments under
it.2 On January 12, 2018, President Trump warned that he would withdraw from the
JCPOA by mid-May unless he “secure[d] our European allies’ agreement to ﬁx [its] terrible
ﬂaws.”3 No such agreement materialized and, on May 8, Trump announced his decision to
withdraw. He also ordered the reimposition of robust primary and secondary sanctions that
had been previously waived pursuant to the JCPOA.
Under the JCPOA, the ﬁve permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany,
and the European Union agreed to relieve Iran from nuclear-related sanctions in exchange for
its agreement to place veriﬁable limits on its nuclear program.4 Shortly after the JCPOA was
reached in July 2015, the Security Council passed Resolution 2231 endorsing the deal.5 This
resolution “[c]alls upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the
JCPOA, including by . . . refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA.”6 Also by the terms of Resolution 2231, “[a]ll states . . . are called
upon to comply” with a statement made by all parties to the JCPOA except Iran, which in turn
provides that “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles
designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” for an eight-year period.7 Pursuant
1
Sarah Begley, Read Donald Trump’s Speech to AIPAC, TIME (Mar. 21, 2016), at http://time.com/4267058/donald-trump-aipac-speech-transcript (providing the transcript of a Trump campaign speech in which he called this
his “number-one priority”).
2
IAEA Director General Press Release, Veriﬁcation and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) (Nov. 13, 2017), available at https://www.iaea.org/
sites/default/ﬁles/17/11/gov2017-48.pdf; IAEA Director General Press Release, Veriﬁcation and Monitoring in
the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) (Aug. 31,
2017), available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/ﬁles/gov2017-35.pdf; IAEA Director General Press
Release, Veriﬁcation and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2231 (2015) (June 2, 2017), available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/ﬁles/gov201724.pdf; IAEA Director General Press Release, Veriﬁcation and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in
Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) (Feb. 24, 2017), available at https://www.
iaea.org/sites/default/ﬁles/gov2017-10.pdf.
3
Donald J. Trump, Statement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to Prevent Iran From Obtaining a
Nuclear Weapon, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 25 (Jan. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Trump Statement].
4
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, 55 ILM 98, 108 (2016) [hereinafter JCPOA]. For further
context, see Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 110 AJIL
789 (2016); Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL
649 (2015).
5
SC Res. 2231, para. 1 (July 20, 2015).
6
Id., para. 2.
7
Id., para. 7(b); Annex B, para. 3.
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to the JCPOA, Resolution 2231 also lifted previous Security Council resolutions that had
imposed sanctions on Iran.8
Over the course of 2017, Trump continued to waive U.S. sanctions pursuant to the JCPOA
but expressed ongoing dissatisfaction with its terms and more generally with Iranian behavior.
One concern involved the sunset provisions of the JCPOA, which included time limits on
certain Iranian commitments to reduce its uranium enrichment.9 Another concern related
to Iran’s ballistic missile testing. Notwithstanding the provision in Resolution 2231 calling
upon it to do otherwise, Iran continued to engage in testing, including by launching a
medium range ballistic missile test within a few days of Trump’s inauguration.10 More generally, Trump signaled disapproval of the JCPOA’s narrow focus on Iran’s nuclear program,
noting that “the Iranian regime continues to fuel conﬂict, terror, and turmoil throughout the
Middle East and beyond.”11 Starting in October 2017, President Trump declined to certify
to Congress that Iran was taking “appropriate and proportionate” measures to end its nuclear
program—a decision that, under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Review Act, provided Congress with
the option of reimposing sanctions on Iran through an expedited legislative procedure.12
When Trump decided to waive sanctions again on January 12, 2018, he announced that he
would withdraw from the JCPOA unless a uniﬁed stance aimed at toughening it was reached
with European allies before the next waiver deadline on May 12, 2018:
Despite my strong inclination, I have not yet withdrawn the United States from the Iran
nuclear deal. Instead, I have outlined two possible paths forward: either ﬁx the deal’s disastrous ﬂaws, or the United States will withdraw.
...
In 2015, the Obama Administration foolishly traded away strong multilateral sanctions
to get its weak nuclear deal. By contrast, my Administration has engaged with key
European allies in seeking to secure a new supplemental agreement that would impose
new multilateral sanctions if Iran develops or tests long-range missiles, thwarts inspections, or makes progress toward a nuclear weapon—requirements that should have
been in the nuclear deal in the ﬁrst place. And, like the bill I expect from Congress,
these provisions of a supplemental agreement must never expire.
8
Id., para. 7(a); see also Jean Galbraith, Ending Security Council Resolutions, 109 AJIL 806, 808–09 (2015)
(detailing how Resolution 2231 contains a snapback provision that effectively allows any single permanent member of the Security Council to reimpose the prior Security Council sanctions under certain conditions).
9
See JCPOA, supra note 4, at para. 15.
10
Idrees Ali, Iran Tested Medium-Range Ballistic Missile: U.S. Ofﬁcial, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2017), at https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-missiles-idUSKBN15E2EZ; see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 111 AJIL 776, 777 (2017) (providing further details). In response,
the Trump administration imposed non-nuclear sanctions on certain Iranian individuals and entities. Id.
11
Donald J. Trump, Remarks on United States Strategy Towards Iran, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 749
(Oct. 13, 2017).
12
Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 120, 125 (2017) (discussing the certiﬁcation process and Trump’s decision to withhold certiﬁcation). In January and April of 2018, Trump again
refused to make a certiﬁcation to Congress. KENNETH KATZMAN, PAUL K. KERR & VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DECISION TO CEASE IMPLEMENTING THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 7 (2018), available at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44942.pdf. Congress did not make use of the expedited procedures set forth in
the Iran Nuclear Review Act, thus leaving it to the president to decide whether or not to continue to waive
sanctions.
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I also call on all our allies to take stronger steps with us to confront Iran’s other malign
activities. Among other actions, our allies should cut off funding to the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, its militant proxies, and anyone else who contributes to
Iran’s support for terrorism. They should designate Hezbollah—in its entirety—as a terrorist organization. They should join us in constraining Iran’s missile development and
stopping its proliferation of missiles, especially to Yemen. They should join us in countering Iran’s cyber threats. They should help us deter Iran’s aggression against international shipping. They should pressure the Iranian regime to stop violating its citizens’
rights. And they should not do business with groups that enrich Iran’s dictatorship or
fund the Revolutionary Guard and its terrorist proxies.
Today, I am waiving the application of certain nuclear sanctions, but only in order to
secure our European allies’ agreement to ﬁx the terrible ﬂaws of the Iran nuclear deal.
This is a last chance. In the absence of such an agreement, the United States will not
again waive sanctions in order to stay in the Iran nuclear deal. And if at any time I
judge that such an agreement is not within reach, I will withdraw from the deal
immediately.13
In response to Trump’s warning, European allies engaged in dialogue regarding his concerns and sought to discourage him from withdrawing from the JCPOA. In February during
a visit with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister Theresa May stated
that they were both “‘ready to take further appropriate measures’” regarding Trump’s concerns about Iranian behavior.14 By the end of March, U.S. ofﬁcials had met three times with
ofﬁcials from the United Kingdom, Germany, and France (the E3) in an unsuccessful
attempt to negotiate the supplemental agreement called for by Trump.15 These meetings
focused on “the sunsetting of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, the omission of [intercontinental ballistic missiles] from the original Iran nuclear agreement, and a stronger
inspections regime.”16 Near the end of April, President Emmanuel Macron of France visited
the United States and indicated his support in principle for a supplemental agreement, while
disagreeing with Trump that withdrawal was an appropriate alternative. He stated, “I believe
we can both combine our common views and our differences, because we are not in a vacuum. I always said we should not tear apart the JCPOA and have nothing else[,] . . . that
would not be the good solution.”17
13
Trump Statement, supra note 3. Trump also outlined his support for possible congressional legislation relating to Iran’s nuclear program if this legislation contained four speciﬁed components. Id.
14
Karen DeYoung, Europeans Look for a Way to Preserve Nuclear Deal While Punishing Iran and Satisfying
Trump, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/europeanslook-for-a-way-to-preserve-nuclear-deal-while-punishing-iran-and-satisfying-trump/2018/02/22/2bc89b8e129f-11e8-9065-e55346f6de81_story.html?utm_term=.803f70b0c8a0.
15
See U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Brieﬁng on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Joint Commission
and E3 Meetings in Vienna and Berlin (Mar. 21, 2018), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/03/279441.
htm [https://perma.cc/2SKU-YPU4].
16
Id.
17
White House Press Release, Remarks by President Trump and President Macron of France in Joint Press
Conference (Apr. 24, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-macron-france-joint-press-conference [https://perma.cc/QR3H-FHEU].
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On May 8, 2018, Trump announced that the United States would end its participation in
the JCPOA and reimpose the lifted sanctions:
In theory, the so-called “Iran deal” was supposed to protect the United States and our
allies from the lunacy of an Iranian nuclear bomb . . . .
...
The agreement was so poorly negotiated that even if Iran fully complies, the regime can
still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in just a short period of time. The deal’s sunset
provisions are totally unacceptable . . . .
Making matters worse, the deal’s inspection provisions lack adequate mechanisms to prevent, detect, and punish cheating, and don’t even have the unqualiﬁed right to inspect
many important locations, including military facilities.
Not only does the deal fail to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but it also fails to address the
regime’s development of ballistic missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads.
...
Therefore, I am announcing today that the United States will withdraw from the Iran
nuclear deal.
...
As we exit the Iran deal, we will be working with our allies to ﬁnd a real, comprehensive,
and lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. . . . In the meantime, powerful sanctions will go into full effect. If the regime continues its nuclear aspirations, it will have
bigger problems than it has ever had before.
...
Iran’s leaders will naturally say that they refuse to negotiate a new deal; they refuse. And
that’s ﬁne. I’d probably say the same thing if I was in their position. But the fact is, they
are going to want to make a new and lasting deal, one that beneﬁts all of Iran and the
Iranian people. When they do, I am ready, willing, and able.18
In conjunction with his remarks, Trump signed a presidential memorandum with ﬁve
main sections explaining the decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and providing directions
to administration ofﬁcials for reimposing sanctions:
Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of the United States that Iran be denied a nuclear
weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles; that Iran’s network and campaign of
regional aggression be neutralized; to disrupt, degrade, or deny the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps and its surrogates access to the resources that sustain
their destabilizing activities; and to counter Iran’s aggressive development of missiles
and other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities. . . .
18

Donald J. Trump, Remarks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a
Nuclear Weapon and an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 310 (May 8, 2018) [hereinafter
Trump Remarks].
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Sec. 2. Ending United States Participation in the JCPOA. The Secretary of State shall, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Energy, take all
appropriate steps to cease the participation of the United States in the JCPOA.
Sec. 3. Restoring United States Sanctions. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
Treasury shall immediately begin taking steps to re-impose all United States sanctions
lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA . . . .
Sec. 4. Preparing for Regional Contingencies. The Secretary of Defense and heads of any
other relevant agencies shall prepare to meet, swiftly and decisively, all possible modes of
Iranian aggression against the United States, our allies, and our partners. . . .
Sec. 5. Monitoring Iran’s Nuclear Conduct and Consultation with Allies and Partners.
Agencies shall take appropriate steps to enable the United States to continue to monitor
Iran’s nuclear conduct. I am open to consultations with allies and partners on future
international agreements to counter the full range of Iran’s threats . . . .19
Trump’s memorandum provided the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury with
speciﬁc guidance for the reimposition of sanctions within 180 days from the date of his memorandum.20 Trump directed the reimposition of sanctions under the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012.21 Trump also instructed the departments to reimpose sanctions lifted
by Executive Order 13716, which had been issued by President Obama in implementing
the JCPOA.22 The sanctions resulting from Trump’s memorandum are a robust combination
of primary and secondary sanctions on domestic and foreign entities, including companies
that do business with various Iranian industries, including energy, and on banks that do business with the Central Bank of Iran.23
In a press brieﬁng, an ofﬁcial from the State Department explained how the United States
would begin to implement Trump’s order:
[T]he sanctions reimposition that the President talked about is going to come in two
phases. There’s going to be one period for wind down that lasts about—that lasts
90 days, and one period of wind down that lasts six months. The six-month wind
down—wind downs are, by the way, pretty standard across sanctions programs. . . .
19
Presidential Memorandum, Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking Additional Action to
Counter Iran’s Malign Inﬂuence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon (May 8, 2018), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ceasing-u-s-participation-jcpoa-taking-additional-action-counterirans-malign-inﬂuence-deny-iran-paths-nuclear-weapon [https://perma.cc/5MTH-GG9F] [hereinafter Trump
Memorandum]. While the memorandum also noted that “[i]n 2016, Iran also twice violated the JCPOA’s
heavy water stockpile limits,” neither it nor Trump’s remarks identiﬁed any Iranian non-compliance with the
JCPOA since the beginning of the Trump administration. See id.; Trump Remarks, supra note 18.
20
Trump Memorandum, supra note 19.
21
Id.
22
Exec. Order No. 13,716, 81 Fed. Reg. 3693, 3693–94 (Jan. 16, 2016).
23
For an overview, see U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-imposition of
Sanctions Pursuant to May 8, 2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (May 8, 2018), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf.
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In this case, we’re providing a six-month wind down for energy-related sanctions. So
that’s oil, petroleum, petrochemicals, and then all of the ancillary sanctions that are associated with that. So, for example, banking; sanctions on the CBI in particular, because the
Central Bank of Iran is involved in Iran’s export of oil and the receipt of revenues.
Shipping, shipbuilding, ports—all of those sanctions that are related to both the energy
sector and then the banking and the shipping or transportation of that energy will all have
a six-month wind down. Everything else is going to have a 90-day wind down. So that’s—
the architecture of the Iranian sanctions program was quite complex, but everything else
includes things like dealing in the rial, providing metal—precious metals and gold to the
Iranian regime, providing U.S. banknotes.24
When questioned about secondary sanctions, the ofﬁcial conﬁrmed that the administration wants to reimpose sanctions on foreign entities that do business with Iran in a way that
was similar to the United States’ pre-JCPOA structure.25 The ofﬁcial acknowledged uncertainty as to how European countries would respond to the secondary sanctions, explaining
that prior to Trump’s withdrawal they had been “focused on negotiating a supplemental
agreement, so we did not—we did not talk about a Plan B.”26
The European Union issued a press release “deeply regretting” the announced U.S. withdrawal.27 It emphasized that “[a]s long as Iran continues to implement its nuclear related
commitments, as it has been doing so far . . . the EU will remain committed to the continued
full and effective implementation of the nuclear deal.”28 Similarly, Macron tweeted that
“France, Germany, and the UK regret the U.S. decision to leave the JCPOA. The nuclear
non-proliferation regime is at stake.”29 He also noted that France will continue to “work collectively on a broader framework, covering nuclear activity, the post-2025 period, ballistic
activity, and stability in the Middle-East, notably Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.”30 UN
Secretary-General António Guterres was “deeply concerned” by Trump’s announcement
and called on other JCPOA participants “to abide fully by their respective commitments
under the JCPOA,” which he described as “a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation
and diplomacy.”31
24
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Background Brieﬁng on President Trump’s Decision To Withdraw From
the JCPOA (May 8, 2018), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/05/281959.htm [https://perma.cc/B2CE4P63].
25
Id. (expressing the expectation that few if any penalties would end up being imposed because foreign entities
would choose not to violate these sanctions).
26
Id.
27
Council of the European Union Press Release, Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU
Following US President Trump’s Announcement on the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) (May 9, 2018), at http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/05/09/declaration-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-eu-following-us-president-trump-s-announcement-on-the-iran-nuclear-deal-jcpoa.
28
Id.
29
Emmanuel Macron (@EmmanuelMacron), TWITTER (May 8, 2018, 11:29 AM), at https://twitter.com/
EmmanuelMacron/status/993920765060878336.
30
Emmanuel Macron (@EmmanuelMacron), TWITTER (May 8, 2018, 11:25 AM), at https://twitter.com/
EmmanuelMacron/status/993919803835539463.
31
United Nations Press Release, Secretary-General ‘Deeply Concerned’ by United States Announcement on
Withdrawing from Iran Nuclear Agreement, Calls on Other Parties to Fulﬁl Commitments (May 8, 2018), at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sgsmn19022.doc.htm.
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In Tehran, rallies were held against Trump’s decision, and the Iranian government
issued a statement denouncing the “new extremist administration.” 32 The Iranian
foreign minister stated that Trump’s decision and memorandum were “in clear
non-compliance with Security Council Resolution 2231” and “constitute a complete
disregard for international law and the United Nations Charter, undermine the principle
of peaceful settlement of disputes, endanger multilateralism and its institutions, . . . and
encourage intransigence and illegality.”33 The Russian Foreign Ministry was “deeply disappointed” by the decision to withdraw and indicated it may be a possible violation of
international law.34
Although most reactions to Trump’s decision were made in regret or in stark opposition, some foreign ofﬁcials offered their support. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
of Israel and Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States, both
made statements backing Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose
sanctions.35
Leaders of E3 issued a joint statement pointing to Resolution 2231 as a binding framework
for addressing the Iranian nuclear program:
Together, we emphasise our continuing commitment to the JCPOA. This agreement
remains important for our shared security. We recall that the JCPOA was unanimously
endorsed by the UN Security Council in resolution 2231. This resolution remains the
binding international legal framework for the resolution of the dispute about the Iranian
nuclear programme. . . .36
Among scholars and practitioners, there is some debate over whether the language in
Resolution 2231 endorsing the JCPOA and calling upon member states to support the
JCPOA’s implementation creates a legally binding obligation.37 The unsigned JCPOA is
not itself a legally binding agreement, or at least this was the strong assumption of its U.S.
32
Thomas Erdbrink & Rick Gladstone, Iran Rallies Against U.S. and Warns Europe Over Endangered Nuclear
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/middleeast/iran-nucleardeal.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fmiddleeast&action=click&contentCollection=middleeast&
region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=20&pgtype=sectio.
33
Letter from M. Javad Zarif, Iranian Foreign Minister, to António Guterres, UN Secretary General (May 10,
2018), at http://en.mfa.ir/index.aspx?fkeyid=&siteid=3&pageid=36409&newsview=514551.
34
Russian FM: Moscow Regrets US Decision to Withdraw from Iran Nuclear Deal, SPUTNIK (May 9, 2018), at
https://sputniknews.com/russia/201805091064271245-russia-iran-nuclear-deal-usa.
35
Trump Withdrew from the Iran Deal. Here’s How Republicans, Democrats and the World Reacted, N.Y. TIMES
(May 8, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-deal-republicansdemocrats-world-reactions.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fmiddleeast&action=click&content
Collection=middleeast&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=late. Some initial reactions from leading
members of Congress were mixed, splitting largely on partisan lines. See id.
36
United Kingdom Press Release, Joint Statement from Prime Minister May, Chancellor Merkel and President
Macron Following President Trump’s Statement on Iran (May 8, 2018), at https://www.gov.uk/government/
news/joint-statement-from-prime-minister-may-chancellor-merkel-and-president-macron-following-presidenttrumps-statement-on-iran.
37
Compare Katayoun Hosseinnejad & Pouria Askary, The International Community and the Challenge to the
Rule of Law: The Future of Iran Nuclear Deal, OPINIO JURIS (May 21, 2018), at http://opiniojuris.org/2018/05/
21/the-international-community-and-the-challenge-to-the-rule-of-law-the-future-of-iran-nuclear-deal (arguing
that it is a binding obligation) with John Bellinger, The New UNSCR on Iran: Does It Bind the United States
(and Future Presidents)?, LAWFARE (July 18, 2015), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-unscr-iran-does-itbind-united-states-and-future-presidents (arguing that it is not a binding obligation).
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negotiators.38 The Security Council Resolution is binding to the extent that it gives a legally
binding directive and triggers the obligations of member states under the UN Charter.39
Resolution 2231 simply “calls upon” states to implement the JCPOA40—it does not, for
example, “decide” that they shall do so. But in its Namibia Advisory Opinion, the
International Court of Justice found, through a case-speciﬁc analysis, that a provision of a
resolution that “calls upon” states to take various actions was binding.41 Notably, a similar
analysis could be undertaken with respect to the provision of Resolution 2231 in which Iran is
“called upon” to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of
delivering nuclear weapons.”42
In the wake of Trump’s decision to withdraw, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced
that the administration will apply “unprecedented ﬁnancial pressure on the Iranian
regime.”43 Pompeo also outlined twelve demands that the United States has for Iran in
any negotiations for a new agreement.44 These include that Iran must
permanently and veriﬁably abandon [military dimensions of its nuclear program,] . . .
stop enrichment[,] . . . provide the IAEA with unqualiﬁed access to all sites throughout
the entire country[,] . . . end proliferation of ballistic missiles[,] . . . end support to Middle
East terrorist groups[,] . . . [and] withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout
the entirety of Syria.45
When asked how he would work with allies with respect to these objectives, he stated that
“[t]he United States intends to work hard at the diplomatic piece of working alongside all
of our partners. We focus on the Europeans, but there are scores of countries around the
world who share our concerns and are equally threatened by the Iranian regime.”46
The European Commission recently initiated the activation of its 1996 blocking statute,
which “forbids EU persons from complying with US extraterritorial sanctions, allows companies to recover damages arising from such sanctions from the person causing them, and
nulliﬁes the effect in the EU of any foreign court judgements based on them.”47 The commission seeks to have the statute activated by August 6, 2018 and thus before the U.S. sanctions
38
Matthew Weybrecht, State Department Afﬁrms That Iran Deal Is Only a Political Commitment, LAWFARE
(Nov. 28, 2015), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-department-afﬁrms-iran-deal-only-politicalcommitment.
39
See UN Charter Art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”).
40
SC Res. 2231, supra note 5, at para. 2.
41
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep. 16, 51–53 (June
21) (ﬁnding paragraph 5 of Resolution 276—which “calls upon all states” to refrain from certain dealings with
South Africa—to bindingly give rise to an “obligation to accept and carry [it] out”).
42
See SC Res. 2231, supra note 5, para. 7(b); Annex B, para. 3.
43
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Remarks, After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy (May 21, 2018), at https://
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/05/282301.htm [https://perma.cc/3C7G-RE5J].
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
European Commission Press Release, European Commission Acts to Protect the Interests of EU Companies
Investing in Iran as Part of the EU’s Continued Commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (May 18,
2018), at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3861_en.htm.
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take effect.48 On May 24, the IAEA reported that Iran had again complied with limits on
uranium enrichment, and, the next day, Iranian ofﬁcials met in Vienna with ofﬁcials from
Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia.49 These countries reafﬁrmed to Iran their commitment to the deal, but an Iranian ofﬁcial told reporters that “[w]e are still complying but we
have not decided whether . . . to stay in the deal or not.”50

United States Bombs Syrian Government Facilities in Response to Chemical Weapons Use
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.58
On April 13, 2018, President Trump ordered the launch of air strikes against Syria in response
to the Syrian government’s apparent use of chemical weapons on civilians in the Syrian town of
Douma a few days earlier.1 The air strikes, which targeted several weapons-related facilities of the
Syrian government,2 were carried out in conjunction with the United Kingdom and France.3
In announcing the strikes, Trump stated in a televised address:
One year ago, [Assad] launched a savage chemical weapons attack against his own
innocent people. The United States responded with 58 missile strikes that destroyed
20 percent of the Syrian Air Force.
Last Saturday, the [Assad] regime again deployed chemical weapons to slaughter innocent civilians—this time, in the town of Douma, near the Syrian capital of Damascus.
This massacre was a signiﬁcant escalation in a pattern of chemical weapons use by that
very terrible regime.
...
The purpose of our actions tonight is to establish a strong deterrent against the production, spread, and use of chemical weapons. Establishing this deterrent is a vital national
security interest of the United States. The combined American, British, and French
response to these atrocities will integrate all instruments of our national power—military,
economic, and diplomatic. We are prepared to sustain this response until the Syrian
regime stops its use of prohibited chemical agents.
...
48

Id.
Iran Seeks Assurances on Nuclear Deal After US Pullout, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 25, 2018), at http://www.
nydailynews.com/newswires/news/world/iran-seeks-assurances-nuclear-deal-pullout-article-1.4009017.
50
Id.
1
Donald J. Trump, Remarks on United States Military Operations in Syria, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 242
(Apr. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Trump Remarks].
2
Donald J. Trump, Letter to Congressional Leaders on United States Military Operations in Syria, 2018 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 243 (Apr. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Trump Letter].
3
White House Press Release, Joined by Allies, President Trump Takes Action to End Syria’s Chemical
Weapons Attacks (Apr. 14, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/joined-allies-president-trump-takesaction-end-syrias-chemical-weapons-attacks [https://perma.cc/7D2J-NWFG].
49
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In 2013, President Putin and his Government promised the world that they would guarantee
the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons. [Assad’s] recent attack—and today’s response—
are the direct result of Russia’s failure to keep that promise. Russia must decide if it will continue down this dark path, or if it will join with civilized nations as a force for stability and
peace. Hopefully, someday we’ll get along with Russia, and maybe even Iran—but maybe not.
...
America does not seek an indeﬁnite presence in Syria under no circumstances. As other
nations step up their contributions, we look forward to the day when we can bring our warriors
home. . . .4
In a press release issued the same day, the White House declared that while it had considered alternative explanations, it had assessed “with conﬁdence” the Syrian government’s
responsibility for the chemical weapons attack on Douma.5 Referencing photographs and
video from “social media users, non-governmental organizations, and other open-source outlets” in Syria, it said that a “signiﬁcant body of information” suggested that chlorine had been
used in the attack, and that “additional information” indicated the use of the nerve agent sarin
as well.6 The White House also accused Syrian president Bashar al-Assad of carrying out collective punishment and executing the attack in a way calculated to inﬂict maximum
suffering.7
The Trump administration blamed Russia for shielding Syria from accountability, saying
in a press release issued by State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert that “Russia . . .
ultimately bears responsibility for these brutal attacks.”8 Nauert also accused Russia of
“breach[ing] its commitments to the United Nations as a framework guarantor . . . [and]
betray[ing] the Chemical Weapons Convention and UN Security Council Resolution
2118.”9 By contrast, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in an interview that the
chemical weapons attack was “staged” as part of a “Russophobic campaign” and “did not
involve any chemical weapons.”10
The United Kingdom and France, both of which participated in the air strikes, asserted
that the air strikes complied with international law—the United Kingdom on a theory of
4

Trump Remarks, supra note 1.
White House Press Release, United States Government Assessment of the Assad Regime’s Chemical Weapons
Use (Apr. 13, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/united-states-government-assessmentassad-regimes-chemical-weapons-use [https://perma.cc/5EAK-DJMW].
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, On the Chemical Attack in Douma (Apr. 7, 2018), at https://www.state.
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280313.htm [https://perma.cc/56XJ-PRMV].
9
Id. Resolution 2118, adopted in September 2013 in the wake of a chemical weapons attack against civilians
during the Syrian civil war, condemned the use of chemical weapons, banned Syria from using them, and welcomed an agreement reached between Russia, the United States, and Syria regarding the destruction of Syria’s
chemical weapons. SC Res. 2118 (Sept. 27, 2013); see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 108 AJIL 94, 95 (2014) (describing this resolution and its
context).
10
Russ. Fed. Foreign Ministry Press Release, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview With BBC
HardTalk (Apr. 16, 2018), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/organizacia-po-zapreseniu-himiceskogo-oruzia/-/asset_publisher/km9HkaXMTium/content/id/3172318.
5
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“humanitarian intervention”11 and France on less clearly speciﬁed grounds.12 On the other
hand, the United States has not offered a consistent or deﬁnitive international law justiﬁcation for the air strikes.13 Some states that did not participate in the strikes have expressed
political support or “understanding” for the air strikes without discussing their legality,
while others have taken stances that neither explicitly condemn nor condone the strikes.14
Finally, some states, including Syria, Russia, China, and South Africa, have explicitly declared
the air strikes to be illegal under international law.15 For example, Russian president Vladimir
Putin called the air strikes
[a]n act of aggression against a sovereign state that is on the frontline in the ﬁght against
terrorism [that] was committed without a mandate from the UN Security Council and in
violation of the UN Charter and norms and principles of international law.16
Russia also introduced a Security Council resolution condemning the air strikes, which was
supported by China and Bolivia.17 Eight Security Council members, including the United
States, United Kingdom, and France, opposed the resolution, while four countries
abstained.18
Shortly after the strikes, Trump sent a letter to Congress regarding his decision to launch
air strikes against Syria and his domestic legal justiﬁcation for doing so. It reads:
At approximately 9:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on April 13, 2018, at my direction,
United States military forces, acting in concert with French and British military forces,
11
Off. of the Brit. Prime Minister Press Release, Syria Action – UK Government Legal Position (Apr. 14,
2018), at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position/syria-actionuk-government-legal-position.
12
See Permanent Mission of France to the UN Press Release, Syria: Silence is No Longer an Option (Apr. 14,
2018), at https://onu.delegfrance.org/Syria-silence-is-no-longer-an-option (describing the strikes as “lawful” and
referencing, among other things, the “goals and values proclaimed in the very ﬁrst lines of the UN Charter”).
13
Justin Florence, What’s the Legal Basis for the Syria Strikes? The Administration Must Acknowledge Limits on Its
Power to Start a War, JUST SECURITY (May 8, 2017), at https://lawfareblog.com/whats-legal-basis-syria-strikesadministration-must-acknowledge-limits-its-power-start-war (commenting that “Members of the
Administration have offered a plethora of inconsistent rationales for the [air] strikes”); cf. Alonso Gurmendi
Dunkelberg, Rebecca Ingber, Priya Pillai & Elvina Pothelet, Mapping States’ Reactions to the Syria Strikes of
April 2018, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 22, 2018), at https://www.justsecurity.org/55157/mapping-states-reactionssyria-strikes-april-2018 (listing possible claims of legality by the United States and more generally surveying
state reactions to the air strikes).
14
Dunkelberg, Ingber, Pillai & Pothelet, supra note 13; see also Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, Rebecca Ingber,
Priya Pillai & Elvina Pothelet, UPDATE: Mapping States’ Reactions to the Syria Strikes of April 2018, JUST
SECURITY (May 7, 2018), at https://www.justsecurity.org/55790/update-mapping-states-reactions-syria-strikesapril-2018 (updating their prior survey to include an additional twenty-three states and dividing the cumulative
responses into ten categories).
15
Dunkelberg, Ingber, Pillai & Pothelet, supra note 13. For scholarly analysis on the legality of the air strikes,
see, e.g., Ryan Goodman, What Do Top Legal Experts Say About the Syria Strikes?, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 7, 2017), at
https://www.justsecurity.org/39712/top-legal-experts-syria-strikes; Jack Goldsmith & Oona Hathaway, Bad Legal
Arguments for the Syria Strikes, LAWFARE (Apr. 14, 2018), https://lawfareblog.com/bad-legal-arguments-syria-airstrikes (addressing legal theories that have been proposed to justify the legality of the air strikes and commenting
that “there is no apparent domestic or international legal authority for the strikes”).
16
President of Russia Press Release, Statement by President of Russia Vladimir Putin (Apr. 14, 2018), at http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57257.
17
Sewell Chan, U.N. Security Council Rejects Russian Resolution Condemning Syrian Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
14, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/world/middleeast/un-security-council-syria-airstrikes.html.
18
Id.
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struck Syrian military chemical weapons-related facilities. The targets of the combined
operation were a scientiﬁc research center installation, a storage facility, and a bunker. I
directed this action in response to the Syrian government’s continued and unlawful use of
chemical weapons, including in the horriﬁc attack in Duma, Syria, on April 7 that injured
or killed numerous innocent civilians. The purpose of this military action was to degrade
the Syrian military’s ability to conduct further chemical weapons attacks and to dissuade
the Syrian government from using or proliferating chemical weapons.
I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and in the vital national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States to promote the stability of the region, to deter the use
and proliferation of chemical weapons, and to avert a worsening of the region’s current
humanitarian catastrophe. The United States will take additional action, as necessary and
appropriate, to further its important national interests.
I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148). I appreciate the support of
the Congress in this action.19
Trump had sent a similar report to Congress in April 2017 after ordering a prior round of
air strikes against a Syrian government airﬁeld in response to the apparent use of chemical
weapons by Syria.20
On May 31, 2018, the Ofﬁce of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice issued a
twenty-two page opinion defending the legality of the strikes as a matter of domestic law,
although not discussing the legality of the strikes under international law.21 Relying on
“the legal opinions of executive advisers and the still weightier precedents of history,” the
memorandum determined that “the President, as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive, has the constitutional authority to deploy the military to protect American persons
and interests without seeking prior authorization from Congress.”22 The memorandum identiﬁed four interests that the Ofﬁce of Legal Counsel had previously recognized as appropriate
justiﬁcations: “the protection of U.S. persons and property”; “assistance to allies”; “support
for the United Nations”; and “promoting regional stability.”23 The memorandum continued:

19

Trump Letter, supra note 2.
Donald J. Trump, Letter to Congressional Leaders on United States Military Operations in Syria, 2017
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 244 (Apr. 8, 2017). A non-proﬁt organization has ﬁled a FOIA lawsuit against the
Trump administration, seeking to obtain documents regarding its legal justiﬁcations for these April 2017 air
strikes. See Chris Mirasola, Summary: Lawsuit to Release the Legal Justiﬁcation of Syria Airstrikes, JUST SECURITY
(Feb. 14, 2018), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-lawsuit-release-legal-justiﬁcation-syria-airstrikes; see
also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 111 AJIL 781
(2017) (discussing these strikes and some issues related to their legality).
21
April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, Memorandum Opinion of May 31, 2018
(Memorandum from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Ofﬁce of Legal Counsel), available at https://
www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/ﬁle/1067551/download. The opinion indicates that legal advice to this effect was
given before the strikes took place. Id. at 1 (noting that “[t]his memorandum explains the bases for our [earlier]
conclusion”).
22
Id. at 3.
23
Id. at 10–11.
20
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In recent years, we have also identiﬁed the U.S. interest in mitigating humanitarian disasters. . . . With respect to Syria, in April 2017, the President identiﬁed the U.S. interest in
preventing the use and proliferation of chemical weapons . . . .
The President identiﬁed three interests in support of the April 2018 Syria strikes: the
promotion of regional stability, the prevention of a worsening of the region’s humanitarian catastrophe, and the deterrence of the use and proliferation of chemical weapons.
Prior to the attack, we advised that the President could reasonably rely on these national
interests to authorize air strikes against particular facilities associated with Syria’s chemical-weapons program without congressional authorization.24
The opinion also addressed “whether the President could expect the Syria operations to rise
to the level of a war requiring congressional authorization.”25 After reviewing prior precedents, it concluded that “[T]he proposed Syrian operation, in its nature, scope, and duration,
fell far short of the kinds of engagements approved by prior Presidents under Article II.”26 In
reaching this conclusion, the opinion noted the absence of ground troops, the narrow focus of
the mission, and its short duration. It added:
Standing on its own, the attack on three Syrian chemical-weapons facilities was not the
kind of “prolonged and substantial military engagement” that would amount to war. . . .
We did not, however, measure the engagement based solely upon the contours of the ﬁrst
strike. Rather, in evaluating the expected scope of hostilities, we also considered the risk
that an initial strike could escalate into a broader conﬂict against Syria or its allies, such as
Russia or Iran. . . .
We were advised that escalation was unlikely (and reviewed materials supporting that
judgment), and we took note of several measures that had been taken to reduce the
risk of escalation by Syria or Russia. . . . Given the absence of ground troops, the limited
mission and time frame, and the efforts to avoid escalation, the anticipated nature, scope,
and duration of these air strikes did not rise to the level of a ‘war’ for constitutional
purposes.27
The April 2018 air strikes came at a time when the Trump administration was considering
scaling back its military presence in Syria. More speciﬁcally, Trump has signaled his interest in
withdrawing U.S. troops after all of the territory held by ISIS has been reclaimed and has
called upon the United States’ regional Arab allies to assume responsibility for post-war stabilization and reconstruction efforts.28 If such an approach comes to be implemented, it
Id. at 11–12; see also id. at 15 (noting that “[i]n some [prior] cases, humanitarian concerns have been a signiﬁcant, or even the primary, interest served by U.S. military operations”).
25
Id. at 18; see also id. at 9 (citing prior precedents in observing that congressional authorization may be required
for a military engagement that rises to the level of a war).
26
Id. at 20.
27
Id. at 21–22.
28
Karen DeYoung & Shane Harris, Trump Instructs Military to Begin Planning for Withdrawal
from Syria, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trumpinstructs-military-to-begin-planning-for-withdrawal-from-syria/2018/04/04/1039f420-3811-11e8-8fd249fe3c675a89_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0281cde6d0c0.
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would also reduce the U.S. role in supporting non-ISIS rebel groups engaged in an ongoing
conﬂict with the Russian-backed Syrian government.29
In the meantime, both Congress and the judicial branch are considering issues related to
the domestic legal authority of the executive branch’s campaign against ISIS. Members of
Congress have introduced various bills to explicitly authorize the use of military force against
ISIS and other speciﬁed terrorist groups, while simultaneously winding down or eliminating
earlier authorizations from 2001 and 2002 that were aimed at responding, respectively, to the
September 11, 2001 attack and the threat posed by the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.30 In
the judicial branch, at least two ongoing cases challenge the executive branch’s current domestic legal authority for its military campaign against ISIS. One of these cases, Smith v. Trump
(formerly Smith v. Obama) was brought by an Army captain; he lost on jurisdictional grounds
in the federal district court and his case is presently on appeal in the D.C. Circuit.31 In the
other case, Doe v. Mattis, an American citizen who was captured in Syria, allegedly while ﬁghting for ISIS, is challenging the legality of his detention, which in turn may depend upon the
legality of the conﬂict against ISIS as a matter of U.S. domestic law.32 He is also challenging
an attempt by the United States government to transfer him to a third country.33
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The most prominent of these is a bipartisan bill, introduced by Senators Corker and Kaine. Authorization for
Use of Military Force of 2018, at § 3(a), SJ Res. 59, 115th Cong. (2018). For discussion of another bill, see
Heather Brandon-Smith, Senator Merkley’s Smart New Alternative AUMF Proposal, JUST SECURITY (May 24,
2018), at https://www.justsecurity.org/56987/senator-merkleys-smart-alternative-aumf-proposal.
31
For an overview, see Sabrina McCubbin, Smith v. Trump: AUMF Challenge Pretrial Motion Summaries,
LAWFARE (Oct. 23, 2017), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/smith-v-trump-aumf-challenge-pretrial-motion-summaries. The case was argued in October 2017 at the D.C. Circuit, but, as of May 2018, the court had not issued its
decision.
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For an analysis on the legal issues, see Robert Chesney, A Primer on the Legal Dispute in Doe v. Mattis,
LAWFARE (Mar. 9, 2018), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/primer-legal-dispute-doe-v-mattis.
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treaty, the United States could only transfer Doe as an enemy combatant if there is “legal authority for the
Executive to wage war against the enemy” and there is “an opportunity for the citizen to contest the factual determination that he is an enemy combatant ﬁghting on behalf of that enemy”). The D.C. Circuit issued this decision
in May 2018 and it remains to be seen whether the United States will seek review of it.

